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INTRODUCTION

Although Amnesty International contends that the death penalty is in all
cases "a violation of the right to life and the right not to be subjected to cruel
and inhumane or degrading punishment,"' the crime of murder is equally
1. Mick Thurston, Amnesty Attacks U.S. Death Sentencing, UPI, Dec. 11, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 (1988)
(noting that death penalty has been abolished in many foreign countries and death penalty
offends civilized standards of decency and should, therefore, be abolished in United States);
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 823-24 n.5 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting Amnesty
International's claim that "[aill European countries forbid imposition of the death penalty on
those under 18"); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 177 n.15 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)

(citing Amnesty International contention that Netherlands and Australia have abolished death
penalty).

1299
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cruel, inhumane, degrading, and a violation of the right to life. Consider the

facts of two cases:
(1) George Elder Dungee2 was convicted and sentenced to death3 on

six counts of murder for the deaths of the members of the Alday family.4 The defendant and three others entered an unoccupied mobile
home for the purpose of burglary. 5 When Mr. Alday and his son arrived at their home, they were escorted at gunpoint into the trailer, and
killed.6 Mr. Alday was shot four times in the head, and his son was
shot seven times in the head. 7 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Alday's brother
arrived at the trailer, and he too was escorted into the trailer at gun-

point and shot in the head.' A few moments later, Mr. Alday's wife
arrived at the trailer, and she was forced into the trailer's kitchen. 9
Two other family members arrived at the trailer and were taken into the
bedrooms where each was shot in the head. 10 The defendant and his

cohorts proceeded to rape Mrs. Alday." She was taken, bound and
blindfolded, to a wooded area and repeatedly raped. 12 In Response to
Mrs. Alday's refusal to commit oral sodomy, the defendants mutilated
her breasts' 3 and then killed her. 4
(2) Eddie Spraggins was found guilty of rape and murder and sentenced to death. 5 The evidence showed that on the afternoon of January 31, 1977, the semi-nude body of Frances Coe, approximately 55
years old, was found in her home.' 6 The defendant had repeatedly
stabbed, slashed, and cut the victim.' 7 Several stab wounds to the body

2. Dungee v. State, 227 S.E.2d 746, 746 (Ga. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976).
The facts of this case are set forth in a companion case reported in Coleman v. State, 226
S.E.2d 911 (Ga. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 909 (1977).
3. Dungee, 227 S.E.2d at 747. The defendant was sentenced on January 9, 1974 for six
counts of murder. Id.
4. Coleman, 226 S.E.2d at 913-14.
5. Id. at 913.
6. Id. Evidence showed that they were both shot in the head at close range. Id.
7. Id.
8. Coleman, 226 S.E.2d at 913. Before Alday was killed, the defendants made him empty
his pockets. Id.
9. Id. The defendants emptied Mrs. Alday's purse, finding her car keys and a dollar bill.
Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Coleman, 226 S.E.2d at 913.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Spraggins v. State, 243 S.E.2d 20, 21 (Ga. 1978).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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caused the victim to bleed heavily.18 The most severe stab wounds were
located in the victim's upper abdomen and lower chest, including two
stab wounds in the upper abdomen which penetrated the victim's
heart.19 The victim was found lying on her bed with her sweater open
and her pantyhose and panties pulled to her ankles.20 Expert testimony
at the trial concluded that, based on the existence of bruises found on
the victim's thigh and near her vaginal opening, the defendant had
manipulated the victim's sexual organs.2" Evidence also showed that
the victim
had been partially disembowelled.2 2 She ultimately bled to
23
death.
Each of these defendants was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in
Georgia. Today, however, these cases have been remanded to their respective trial courts for the determination of the intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of
each defendant. In Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Maryland, and New
Mexico, a defendant who obtains an I.Q. score of seventy or less is excused
from the death penalty, even when the defendant's subaverage intelligence
did not prevent the defendant from discerning the difference between right
and wrong. 24

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Spraggins, 243 S.E.2d at 21.
Id.
Id. No sperm cells were found on the victim. Id. at 21-22. However, Dr. Dawson

testified that during the victim's autopsy he found "hemorrhaging around the victim's urethra
and a small tear in the vaginal orifice." Id. at 21.
22. Id.
23. Spraggins, 243 S.E.2d at 21.
24. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie Supp. 1992) (describing presumption of
mental retardation). The statute reads in pertinent part: "If the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant is mentally retarded, it shall sentence the defendant to
life imprisonment .... An intelligence quotient of seventy or below on a reliably administered
intelligence quotient test shall be presumptive evidence of mental retardation." Id; see GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992) (stating requirements for imposing
death penalty). The statute states that if a defendant who is adjudged guilty is mentally retarded, "the death penalty shall not be imposed and the court shall sentence the defendant to
imprisonment for life." Id. This statute is effective for any trial "in which the death penalty is
sought which commences on or after July 1, 1988." Id; see also KY. REV. STAT. § 532.140
(Michie 1990) (providing no person determined to be severely mentally retarded shall be subject to death penalty); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(f) (1991) (stating penalty for mentally
retarded defendants may not be death); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(3)(b) (1991) (providing mentally retarded defendants shall not be sentenced to death); Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d
339, 340 (Ga. 1989) (applying Georgia's amended statute exempting mentally retarded from
death penalty). But see Levy v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., 399 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1979) (holding I.Q. scores do not constitute substantial evidence of mental retardation).
See Mary D. Bicknell, Note, ConstitutionalLaw: The Eighth Amendment Does Not Prohibit
the Execution of Mentally Retarded Convicts, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 357, 371 (1990) (supporting
Maryland and Georgia's "bright line" rule that sets I.Q. of 70 as dividing line between those
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Throughout the United States, a debate is being waged25 that has specific
significance for the mentally retarded, especially for the more than 250 mentally retarded defendants sitting on death row.2 6 The United States Supreme
Court has held that it is not cruel and unusual punishment to execute a
mentally retarded person convicted of a capital crime.27 In so holding, the

who can be executed and those who cannot). See generally CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RE-

13 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. ed., 1983) (placing I.Q. of 70 as upper limit for
mental retardation).
25. For a general discussion on both the skewed results that can arise from using I.Q.s
TARDATION

alone to classify persons as mentally retarded and the use of such scores in the capital sentenc-

ing of the mentally retarded, respectively, see generally Bruce Cushna, The PsychologicalDefinition of Mental Retardation: A Historical Overview, in EMOTIONAL DISORDERS OF
MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 31 (Ludwik S. Szymanski, M.D. & Peter E. Tanguay, M.D.
eds., 1980); James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded CriminalDefendants, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414 (1985).
26. See Juliet L. Ream, Comment, Capital Punishmentfor Mentally Retarded Offenders:
Is It Morally and ConstitutionallyImpermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L. REV. 89, 112-13 (1990) (stating that as of 1989, 250 of 2,000 inmates on death row in United States were mentally retarded). Although the exact number of inmates on death row varies according to the source,
the number is large enough to warrant a serious inquiry into determining what proportion of
these inmates are mentally retarded. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 669 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (finding 2,327 convicted murderers on death row as of May 1990); Daniels v.
Zant, 494 F. Supp. 720, 721 (M.D. Ga. 1980) (noting Georgia has 96 individuals on death
row); PAUL R. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 15 (ACLU
Handbook 1976) (finding 10% of total prison population mentally retarded, which equals approximately 21,000 inmates); Marianne Lavelle, Strong Law Thwarts Lone Star Counsel,
NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 31 (finding 320 prisoners on death row in Texas); cf Rector v.
Bryant,

-

U.S.

-,

-,

111 S. Ct. 2872, 2875, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1038, 1041 (1991) (Marshall, J.

dissenting) (dissenting from denying certiorari and noting many death row inmates suffer serious mental impairments).
27. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (giving death sentence to mentally
retarded defendant found competent to stand trial not within Eighth Amendment prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishments); Mathenia v. Delo, 975 F.2d 444, 453 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding mental retardation insufficient to support diminished capacity defense to capital murder),
cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3652 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1993) (No. 92-7457); Williams v. Dixon, 961
F.2d 448, 451 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that imposition of death penalty on mildly mentally
retarded defendant does not violate Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct.
510, 121 L. Ed. 2d 445 (1992); Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472, 1481-82 (4th Cir. 1991)
(finding sentence of death for defendant who suffered from organic brain damage did not violate Eighth Amendment); Prejean v. Smith, 889 F.2d 1391, 1402 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
mental retardation alone not bar to death penalty), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); Brogdon v. Butler, 824 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding imposition of death penalty on
mentally retarded not cruel and unusual punishment). In Brogdon, the court distinguished
mental retardation from insanity, asserting that mental retardation does not, by itself, constitute an incapacity to know the difference between wrong and right. Id.; see Melton v. Hendrick, 330 F.2d 263, 266 (3d Cir. 1964) (holding imposition of death penalty on mentally
retarded not cruel and unusual punishment per se if court fully considers defendant's mental
condition). Contra Fleming, 386 S.E.2d at 343 (holding execution of mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). See generally Mary D. Bicknell, Note, Constitutional

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol24/iss4/12

4

Rumley: A License to Kill: The Categorical Exemption of the Mentally Reta

1993]

COMMENT

1303

Court argued that because only one state explicitly banned this punishment,
a national consensus opposing the execution of the mentally retarded did not
exist.28 Sympathizing with the mentally retarded, states have since enacted,
and are now proposing, legislation exempting the mentally retarded from the
death penalty based solely on these persons' I.Q.'s.2 9 Consequently, over

Law: The Eighth Amendment Does Not Prohibitthe Execution of Mentally Retarded Convicts,
43 OKLA. L. REV. 357, 364-70 (1990) (discussing constitutionality of executing mentally retarded capital offenders); Patricia Hagenah, Note, Imposing the Death Sentence on Mentally
Retarded Defendants: The Case of Penry v. Lynaugh, 59 UMKC L. REV. 135, 139-42 (1990)
(discussing Penry's holding that it is not cruel and unusual punishment to impose death penalty on mentally retarded individuals).
28. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 335 (finding insufficient evidence of national consensus against
executing mentally retarded defendants to establish categorical exemption); cf Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-371 (1989) (finding 15 states prohibit execution of 16-year-old
offenders and 12 states prohibit execution of 17-year-old offenders). In Stanford, the Court
contended that a national consensus against capital sentencing of criminal offenders below age
sixteen did not exist. Id; see Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823-29 (examining state legislation). In
Thompson, the Court found a national consensus against the imposition of the death penalty
on fifteen-year-old defendants. Id. Accordingly, the Court suggested that it is cruel and unusual to execute defendants who are fifteen years old and younger. Id. at 833; see also Tison,
481 U.S. at 154 (finding recent state legislation authorizing imposition of death penalty on
felony murder "powerfully suggests" that society condones this punishment); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) (finding "no state in the Union" permitting execution of
insane defendants proving lack of sufficient national consensus to prohibit their execution);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977) (finding national consensus against imposition
of death penalty for rape of adult women); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976)
(finding that 35 states reenacting capital-sentencing statutes after Furman signifies societal
consensus in executing capital murderers); see also Robert P. Gritton, Comment, CapitalPunishment: New Weapons in the Sentencing Process, 24 GA. L. REV. 423, 431-35 (1990) (arguing
national consensus against execution of juveniles and mentally retarded capital offenders exist);
Andrew H. Friedman, Note, Tison v. Arizona: The Death Penalty and the Non-Triggerman:
The Scales of Justice Are Broken, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 127 (1989) (discussing Supreme
Court's national consensus analysis in determining constitutionality of particular punishment);
Robert Woll, Note, The Death Penalty and Federalism: Eighth Amendment Constraintson the
Allocation of State Decision Making, 35 STAN. L. REV. 787, 803-04 (1983) (arguing that evolving standards of decency demand national consensus against that particular punishment before
Court can find it cruel and unusual); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term - Leading Cases, 103
HARV. L. REV. 137, 151 (1989) (discussing Supreme Court's national consensus analysis in
Penry).
29. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie Supp. 1992) (prohibiting death penalty
for mentally retarded persons). The statute reads in pertinent part: "An intelligence quotient
of seventy or below on a reliably administered intelligence quotient test shall be presumptive
evidence of mental retardation.... If the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant is mentally retarded, it shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment." Id.;
see also GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992) (prohibiting death penalty
for mentally retarded persons). The statute reads in pertinent part: "the death penalty shall
not be imposed and the court shall not sentence the defendant to imprisonment for life." Id.
This statute is effective for any trial in which the death penalty is sought that commences on or
after July 1, 1988. Id.; see also Fleming, 386 S.E.2d at 340 (applying Georgia's amended
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250 mentally retarded death-row inmates' lives are in limbo, as they wait for
either the enactment of a statute in their respective states exempting the
mentally retarded from the death penalty, or the United States Supreme
Court's reconsideration of its national consensus analysis in light of the
newly enacted exculpation statutes.30
This Comment will show that there is no merit to the argument that the
Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the imposition of capital punishment on all persons considered to be mentally retarded, regardless of their
degree of retardation. 3 1 This Comment begins with an overview of the historical treatment of mental disabilities, articulating the levels of mental deficiency required for exculpation of criminal responsibility. Next, this
Comment discusses the characteristics of persons with mental retardation,
demonstrating the misconception the public has about these individuals.
This Comment will also discuss the recently enacted statutes' use of I.Q.
tests for determinations of mental retardation. In analyzing these statutes, it
becomes apparent that a person's I.Q. should not be prima-facie proof of
mental retardation, although state legislatures are suggesting otherwise. Additionally, this Comment will discuss the constitutionality of imposing the
death penalty on mentally retarded capital murderers, setting forth the sentencing guidelines as well as the Supreme Court's reasoning. Finally, this
comment will propose an alternative to the state legislatures' I.Q.-exemption
statutes, suggesting hurdles that courts must overcome before imposing the
death penalty on mentally retarded capital murderers. The proposed guidestatute exempting mentally retarded persons from death penalty); Mary D. Bicknell, Note,
ConstitutionalLaw.- The Eighth Amendment Does Not Prohibitthe Execution of Mentally Retarded Convicts, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 357, 371 (1990) (supporting Maryland and Georgia's
"bright line" rule setting I.Q. of 70 as dividing line determining persons who can be executed).
See generally CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 13 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D.
ed., 1983) (placing I.Q. of 70 as upper limit for mental retardation).
30. Cf State v. Patillo, 417 S.E.2d 139, 140-41 (Ga. 1992) (vacating defendant's death
sentence based on Georgia statute); Fleming, 386 S.E.2d at 340-43 (vacating defendant's death
sentence for killing police officer based on Georgia statute); Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 840
S.W.2d 317, 351 (Tenn. 1992) (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (noting majority opinion
vacating defendant's death sentence for felony murder and kidnapping based on TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-203 (1990)); State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 189 n.15 (Tenn. 1991) (acknowledging statute's prohibition against executing defendants who are mentally retarded). See generally Kathryn S. Berthot, Comment, Bifurcation in Insanity Trials.: A Change in Maryland's
Criminal Procedure, 48 MD. L. REV. 1045, 1052-62 (1989) (discussing newly enacted Maryland statute exonerating mentally retarded as group from criminal responsibility).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted." Id. The Eighth Amendment was held applicable to the states by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
666-67 (1962) (applying cruel-and-unusual-punishments analysis to state law through Fourteenth Amendment).
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lines will continue punishing culpable mentally retarded defendants, while
exonerating incompetent mentally retarded defendants.
II.

THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF MENTAL DISABILITIES

The exculpation of "idiots" from the death penalty has long been recognized and is now firmly ingrained in English and American common-law
jurisprudence.3 2 The inherent point of disagreement, however, arises in the
determination of what level of mental disability constitutes "idiocy" sufficient for exoneration from criminal responsibility. 33 Presently, a majority of
states recognize that mental retardation is different from what the common
law considered "idiocy" in that mental retardation does not provide a complete defense to a criminal act.3 4 However, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky,

32. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331-33 (1989) (noting well-settled common law

that both "idiots" and "lunatics" are exonerated from criminal responsibility); see also Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407 (1986) (arguing that executing individuals who are "mad" is
extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and citing common-law philosophy that if defendant becomes
insane, execution is inhumane). See generally James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally
Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 432 (1985) (finding well-established authorities accepting proposition that idiots are exculpated from criminal responsibility); Ptolemy H. Taylor, Comment, Execution of the "Artificially Competent" Cruel and
Unusual?,66 TUL. L. REV. 1045, 1049-52 (1992) (discussing long-standing, common-law prohibition against executing insane defendants).
33. Compare Penry, 492 U.S. at 333 (contending that "severe" or "profoundly" mentally
retarded person may be sufficiently mentally deficient to be exonerated from death penalty)
and Mathenia v. Delo, 975 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir. 1992) (contending that mental retardation
alone is insufficient to support exoneration from death penalty) with Fleming v. Zant, 386
S.E.2d 339, 342-43 (Ga. 1989) (finding mental retardation sufficient mental disability for exoneration from death penalty). While distinguishing mental disabilities that were sufficient to
exonerate criminal responsibility, early distinctions were made between "idiots" who were
mentally deficient, and "lunatics," who were congenitally insane. See Patricia Hagenah, Note,
Imposing the Death Sentence on Mentally Retarded Defendants: The Case of Penry v.
Lynaugh, 59 UMKC L. REV. 135, 149-52 (1990) (arguing that mentally retarded defendants
should be exonerated from death penalty because mental retardation eliminates amount of
culpability required for death penalty); Comment, Lunacy and Idiocy--The Old Law and its
Incubus, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 362 (1951) (discussing difference between "idiots" and
"lunatics").
34. See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 339-40 (conceding that mental retardation may lessen
defendant's culpability but does not, by itself, exonerate criminal responsibility); State v. Jones,
378 S.E.2d 594, 597 (S.C. 1989) (holding mental retardation does not bar imposition of death
penalty), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060 (1990); Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) (granting writ of habeas corpus because jury not instructed to
consider fully mitigating evidence of defendant's mental retardation); contra Fleming, 386
S.E.2d at 340 (providing mentally retarded defendants with complete defense to due process).
See generally James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants,
53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 432-40 (1985) (discussing history of mental non-responsibility
for criminal conduct); Kathryn S. Berthot, Comment, Bifurcation in Insanity Trials: A Change
in Maryland's CriminalProcedure,48 MD. L. REV. 1045, 1052-62 (1989) (discussing judicial
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Maryland, and New Mexico contend that mentally retarded individuals having an I.Q. of seventy or less can never act with the degree of blameworthiness that is associated with the death penalty."
A.

Exculpation of Criminal Responsibility

Historically, the first attempt to define the level of mental disability required for exculpation from criminal responsibility appears in legal doctrines
of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.3 6 Texts of these centuries distinguish a "lunatic" or a violently insane person, from an "idiot" or a mentally
deficient or disturbed person, finding that both categories of mental deficiency could be used as a defense to criminal prosecution.37 Beginning in the

interpretations of Maryland statute categorically exonerating mentally retarded persons from
criminal responsibility); Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation:
The Improper Consideration of MitigatingFactors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 409, 417-19 (1990) (acknowledging long-standing debate over what level of mental capacity vitiates criminal responsibility); Comment, Johnson v. State - Diminished Capacity Rejected as a CriminalDefense, 42 MD. L. REV. 522, 527 (1983) (discussing Maryland statute
exoneration of mentally retarded individuals from criminal responsibility).
35. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992) (stating death
penalty shall not be imposed on mentally retarded defendant); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1
(Michie Supp. 1992) (exempting mentally retarded defendants from death penalty based on
I.Q. of 70 or below). I.Q. tests should not be used as a unitary measures of whether or not a
defendant will be executed. See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (arguing
against using objective standards in determining judgments of abnormal offenders). In Diggs,
the court opined that the decision to exonerate from criminal responsibility must be based on
the instinctive sense of justice of ordinary men, by deciding whether the defendant could distinguish between right and wrong, and not on objective standard. Id. See generally Mary D.
Bicknell, Note, ConstitutionalLaw: The Eighth Amendment Does Not Prohibit the Execution
of Mentally Retarded Convicts, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 357, 371 (1990) (supporting Georgia and
Maryland's "bright line" rule). The "bright line" rule is a label the author adopts to describe
Georgia and Maryland's statutes exculpating mentally retarded individuals from the death
penalty. Id. Bicknell argues that individuals who have an I.Q. of seventy or below cannot act
with the necessary degree of blameworthiness that is associated with death penalty. Id.; see
Kathryn S. Berthot, Comment, Bifurcation in Insanity Trials: A Change in Maryland's Criminal Procedure,48 MD. L. REV. 1045, 1052-62 (1989) (discussing Maryland statute that states
mentally retarded lack degree of culpability required for criminal responsibility).
36. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331-33 (1989) (discussing historical development
of criminal responsibility); James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 416-17 (1985) (discussing origins of legal distinction
between "idiots" and "lunatics"). The first legal distinction made between "idiots" and
"lunatics" is said to have most likely occurred in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. See
Comment, Lunacy and Idiocy-The Old Law and its Incubus, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 362-33
(1951) (discussing origins of legal distinction in terminology regarding "insane" and "idiot").
Statutes made in the fourteenth century made distinctions, which provided that the land of
"natural fools" would be given to the king to manage and for profit, whereas the lands of the
"non compos mentis" would be given to the King temporarily, and not for profit. Id. at 362.
37. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 331-32 (discussing common-law standards of exculpation from
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1500s, the "counting twenty pence" test was used to determine whether a
person was an idiot.38 Another test eventually developed, and in the early
eighteenth-century case of Rex v. Arnold,39 the court devised the "wild
beast" test to determine whether a mentally disabled person was exonerated
from the death penalty.' According to this test, an individual who "doth
not know what [he or she was] doing, no more than an infant, than a brute,
or a wild beast," was exonerated of the death penalty. 4'

criminal responsibility). In Penry, the Court identified that at common law, both "idiot" and

"lunatics" were free from criminal responsibility. Id. at 331. The common-law terms of "idiot" and "lunatics" were defined as individuals under a natural disability, who are unable to
discern right from wrong at the time the criminal act occurred. See Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d
117, 123-24 (Del. 1990) (noting differences between insanity and mental illness); State v.
Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 934 (Idaho 1990) (acknowledging common-law prohibition against holding "idiots" responsible for crimes); State v. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d 19, 25 (S.C. 1992) (noting that
ancient common law forbade execution of individuals who were "idiots," "lunatics," or both),
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 137, 121 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1992); see also James W. Ellis &
Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414,
417 n. 15 (1985) (citing early scholarly works finding "idiocy" protected from punishment, but
"lunacy" protected only from punishments for acts done during prevalence of individual's
lunacy). See generally Comment, Lunacy and Idiocy---The Old Law and its Incubus, 18 U.
CHI. L. REV. 361, 361-63 (1951) (discussing difference at common law between "lunatics" and
"idiots").
38. See Searcy, 798 P.2d at 929 (discussing "twenty pence" test). Under this test, a defendant is exonerated from criminal responsibility when he "cannot account or number twenty
pence, nor can tell who was his father or mother, nor how old he is etc., so as it may appear he
hath no understanding of reason what shall be for his profit, or what for his loss." See S.
SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 128 (1925) (discussing
role of "twenty pence" test in historical origins of insanity) (citing A. FITZHERBERT, NATURA
BREVIUM (1534)); James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded CriminalDefendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 416-17 (1985) (discussing "twenty pence" test); Eric L.
Shwartz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: "Idiocy" and the Framers' Intent Doctrine, 16 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 315, 329-30 (1990) (describing "twenty pence" test).
In his Comment, Shwartz argues that individuals who are only mildly retarded would be con-

sidered idiots under this twenty-pence test. Id.
39. 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 765 (Eng. 1724), cited in James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson,
Mentally Retarded CriminalDefendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 433 (1985).
40. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 332 (discussing "wild beast" test); United States v. Brawner,
471 F.2d 969, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing "wild beast" test to determine whether defendant can distinguish good from evil); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 725 (6th Cir.
1968) (discussing "wild beast" test in determining defendant's sanity); Washington v. United
States, 390 F.2d 444, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting test for criminal responsibility in early
eighteenth century was "wild beast" test); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 869 (D.C.
Cir. 1954) (noting right-wrong test has its origin in "wild beast" test of eighteenth century).
See generally Michael Perlin, Unpacking the Myths. The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence,40 CASE W. RES. 599, 631-32 (1990) (discussing development of insanity defense by way of "wild beast" test); Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An
Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J.
1371, 1375 (1986) (discussing "wild beast" test of insanity).
41. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 332 (discussing early common-law definitions of insanity); see
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The M'Naghten Test

In 1843, the House of Lords decided Daniel M'Naghten's Case,42 creating
the most widely accepted test for deciding which mentally disabled persons
should be exonerated from criminal responsibility. 43 Under the M'Naghten
test, a court must consider whether the defendant suffers from a defect of
reason or from a disease of the mind that either prevents him from knowing
the nature and quality of his acts or that clouds his judgment to such a
degree that he is unaware that his act is wrong. 44
also People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 759 (Cal. 1985) (discussing "wild beast" test); Sanders,
585 A.2d at 137 (discussing definition of insanity). See generally James W. Ellis & Ruth A.
Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 432-33
(1985) (discussing role of "wild best" test in development of requirements for mental responsibility); Judith A. Northrup, Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: Broadening the Scope of Criminal Responsibility, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 797, 802 (1983) (discussing historical approaches to
determining insanity).
42. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
43. See Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897) (defining insanity as "perverted
and deranged condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render a person incapable of
distinguishing between right and wrong"). In fashioning a definition of insanity, American
courts have followed the English case of M'Naghten. Id. The Supreme Court argued that to
be excused from criminal responsibility, the governing power of the defendant's mind must be
beyond his control when deciding whether to do the criminal act. Id. The definition of insanity as set forth in Davis firmly established the law of insanity in the United States. See, e.g.,
Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Fahay, J., concurring) (acknowledging criminal-responsibility test of M'Naghten); Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274, 277
(5th Cir. 1956) (accepting right-wrong test of Davis); Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665,
666 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (noting ordinary test used in determination of criminal responsibility is
whether defendant could tell right from wrong), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 852 (1948); Smith v.
United States, 36 F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929) (discussing adoption of English rule in determination of insanity). In Smith, the court held that one must possess, at the time the crime
was committed, a degree of insanity to "override the reason and judgment and obliterate the
sense of right and wrong to the extent that the accused is deprived of the power to choose
between right and wrong," in order to be exonerated from punishment. Id.; cf Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 796 (1951) (noting Oregon's adoption of M'Naghten test). See generally
Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Originsof the "Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal
Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: A Historical Survey, 54
CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1228-31 (1966) (discussing antecedents of M'Naghten's right-from-wrong
distinction); Margaret C. McHugh, Comment, Greenfield v. Wainwright: The Use of PostMiranda Silence To Rebut the Insanity Defense, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 227-28 (1985) (arguing for expansion of M'Naghten in current determination of insanity).
44. See Blocker, 288 F.2d at 877 (acknowledging right-wrong test in determining exoneration of criminal responsibility); Howard, 232 F.2d at 275 (acknowledging criminal-responsibility test as incapacity resulting from some mental disability to distinguish between right and
wrong); accord Davis, 165 U.S. at 378 (recognizing right-wrong test of M'Naghten). In Davis,
the Court opined that an accused who is incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong
with respect to the criminal act because of some mental disability is unable to refrain from
doing wrong. Id. But see Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
(holding criminal not responsible for unlawful act if act "a product of mental disease or mental
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Although the M'Naghten test came to be well accepted in the United
States throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it was not until
1986 that the United States Supreme Court, in Ford v. Wainwright,4 5 explicitly held that the execution of insane persons is cruel and unusual punishment.4 6 The Court based its decision upon the common-law prohibition on
executing persons who do not have the mental capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their actions or the reasons why they are being punished.4 7
defect"). See Anne S. Emanuel, Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdicts and the Death Penalty: An

Eighth Amendment Analysis, 68 N.C. L. REV. 37, 42-44 (1989) (discussing traditional legal
definitions of insanity); Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 262-63
(1987) (discussing M'Naghten's reliance on mental disease making defendant unable to know
nature of his act).
45. 477 U.S. 399, 408-10 (1986). Ford was found competent both at the time of the
murder and at his trial. Id. at 401-02. Instead, after he was convicted, Ford began to manifest
changes in his behavior to the point where he had no idea of his sentence, nor the reasoning
behind the sentence. Id. at 402-03. See generally Gordon L. Moore III, Comment, Ford v.
Wainwright: A Coda in the Executioner's Song, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1461, 1462-65 (1987) (discussing facts and procedural background of Ford); Rachelle Deckert Dick, Note, Ford v.
Wainwright: Warning-Sanity on Death Row May Be Hazardous to Your Health, 47 LA. L.
REV. 1351, 1352-53 (1987) (discussing prohibition of death penalty on individuals who are
insane).
46. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10. In Ford, the Court found the execution of insane defendants cruel and unusual punishment because it was inconsistent with the evolving standards of
decency. Id. at 408-10. Even prior to this holding, numerous American courts had recognized
the prohibition against the execution of defendants who are incapable of discerning right from
wrong. See, e.g., State v. Helm, 61 S.W. 915, 916-17 (Ark. 1901) (noting that history of English common law disfavored execution of mentally incompetent persons); People v. Geary, 131
N.E. 652, 655-56 (Ill. 1921) (interpreting Illinois death-penalty statute as prohibiting execution
of insane persons); Barker v. State, 106 N.W. 450, 451 (Neb. 1905) (noting Nebraska law does
not punish by death those found mentally incompetent); In re Smith, 176 P. 819, 822 (N.M.
1918) (noting common law prohibited execution of insane persons). See generally Rachelle
Deckert Dick, Note, Ford v. Wainwright: Warning-Sanity on Death Row May Be Hazardous
To Your Health, 47 LA. L. REV. 1351, 1351-53 (1987) (discussing Court's recognition of
Eighth Amendment prohibition against executing insane); Dana Lowy, Note, Perry v. Louisiana: To Execute Or Not To Execute a Mentally Incompetent Convicted Criminal... That
Remains the Question, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 205, 209-210 (1992) (discussing insanity and death
penalty).
47. Ford, 477 U.S. at 417-18 (holding that individual "unaware of the punishment they
are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it" cannot be punished). The Supreme Court
reasoned that to execute a defendant who has no capacity to understand his actions was abhorrent and offended humanity. Id. at 409. Additionally, the Court reasoned that to execute
individuals who were insane contributes nothing to the deterrent value of the death penalty.
Id. at 407. Furthermore, the execution of individuals who were insane served no useful purpose because those individuals were already being punished by their madness. Id. at 407-08.
Prior to Ford, courts had recognized Eighth Amendment rights for the insane. See Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (holding unconstitutional convicting accused individual
while insane); Blocker, 288 F.2d at 857-62 (Burger, J., concurring) (discussing weaknesses in
disease-defect-product test used in determining whether to exonerate defendant from criminal
responsibility); State v. Bradley, 433 P.2d 273, 277 (Ark. 1967) (noting long-standing principle
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The Court contended that a national consensus opposing the imposition of
capital punishment on the insane existed, which compelled the Court to conclude that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of such
individuals.4 8
Even though Wainwright involved an insane individual, it is well settled in
common law that the competency test of M'Naghten is applicable not only to
those defendants who are insane, but to mentally retarded individuals as

that insane person cannot be tried, convicted, or punished for public offense while insane);
State v. Saxon, 190 N.W.2d 854, 856 (Neb. 1971) (stating individual lacking capacity to understand proceedings against him is exonerated from criminal responsibility). In Blocker, the
concurring opinion asserted that the standard for exoneration was whether the defendant's
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect. Blocker, 288 F.2d at 857.
Criticizing this test, the concurring opinion found that the disease-product test totally ignored
the free will of the defendant. Id. at 858. Accordingly, the concurring opinion argued that a
defendant should be excused of criminal responsibility only when the mental disease affected
him so substantially that he could not comprehend the wrongfulness of the act. Id. at 862; see
also Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (discussing degree of criminal
intent needed to exonerate defendant from criminal responsibility). In Carter, the court opined
that "[t]he basic import of criminal law is punishment for a 'vicious will' which motivates a
criminal act." Id. Those defendants who are "confronted with a choice between doing right
or wrong and freely choose to do wrong" should be responsible for their criminal activity. Id.
However, if a defendant is unable to freely choose between right and wrong, or cannot distinguish between the two, he is "outside the postulate of the law of punishment" and, thus, is
unable to form the intent required of the crime. Id; see V. Stephen Cohen, Comment, Exempting the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty: A Comment on Florida's Proposed Legislation, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 457, 466 (1991) (arguing Ford extended exoneration of insane
defendants from death penalty to mentally retarded); see also The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 100 (1986) (discussing Court's recognition of
common law in prohibiting execution of insane persons); William A. Aniskovish, Note, In
Defense of the Framers' Intent: Civic Virtue, the Bill of Rights, and the Framers' Science of
Politics, 75 VA. L. REV. 1311, 1320-21 (1989) (discussing Court's exculpation of insane from
death penalty).
48. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408-10 (finding no states permitting execution of insane defendants).
The Supreme Court noted that "41 states have a death penalty or statutes governing execution
procedures" and "26 states have statutes explicitly requiring the suspension of the execution of
a prisoner who meets the legal test for incompetence." Id. at 408 n.2. From this statistic, the
Court concluded "that the ancient and humane limitation upon the State's ability to execute its
sentences has a firm hold upon the jurisprudence of today." Id. at 409; see Penry, 492 U.S. at
334 (arguing no state permits execution of insane defendants). Compare Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) (declaring majority of states permitting execution of 16-year-old
individuals demonstrates absence of national consensus against such punishment) and Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 154 (1987) (finding several states permitting execution of felony murderers regardless of intent "powerfully suggests" no national consensus against such punishment) with Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (finding no authority condoning execution of insane
defendants) and Coker v.Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594 (1977) (finding no state authorizes death
penalty for rape). See generally Ptolemy H. Taylor, Comment, Execution of the "Artificially
Competent": Cruel and Unusual?, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1045 (1992) (arguing against execution of
mentally retarded defendants).
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well.4 9 Consequently, it may be a cruel and unusual punishment to execute
a severely or profoundly retarded defendant who lacks the amount of mental
capacity sufficient for competency under M'Naghten.'o However, mental retardation in itself should not excuse a defendant of criminal responsibility
when there is evidence that the defendant is capable of discerning the difference between right and wrong. 5

49. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 332-33 (finding that common-law prohibition against executing
"idiots" applies to those persons who lack reasoning capacity to discern difference between
wrong and right); Wartena v. State, 5 N.E. 20, 23 (Ind. 1886) (holding that "[i]mbecility of
mind may be of such degree as to constitute insanity"); State v. Pinski, 163 S.W.2d 785, 787-88
(Mo. 1942) (recognizing mental incapacity includes not only insanity but also any mental incapacity that makes defendant unable to distinguish wrong from right); State v. Johnson, 290
N.W. 159, 162 (Wis. 1940) (finding both insane and feeble-minded persons can be exonerated
from criminal responsibility if unable to distinguish difference from right and wrong). See
generally James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 432-42 (1985) (discussing development of MNaghten test).
50. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 333 (suggesting that it may be cruel and unusual to execute
profoundly or severely retarded defendants). In Penry, the Court opined that the common-law
prohibition against executing "idiots" may suggest that it is cruel and unusual punishment to
sentence to death severely or profoundly retarded defendants who lack the mental capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of their criminal conduct. Id. See generally V. Stephen Cohen,
Comment, Exempting the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty: A Comment On Florida's Proposed Legislation, 19 FLA, ST. U. L. REV. 457, 468 (1991) (arguing that Penry offers
hope for only severe and profoundly retarded persons and not for moderately retarded persons); Rebecca Dick-Hurwitz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: The Supreme Court Deals a Fatal Blow to Mentally Retarded Capital Defendants, 51 U. PiTT. L. REV. 699, 707 (1990)
(discussing Penry's assertion that execution of severely and profoundly retarded defendants
may be cruel and unusual punishment).
51. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 332-33 (finding exculpation of criminal responsibility only
when defendant is incapable of conforming his conduct to requirements of law); Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (recognizing defendant must have "capacity to understand
nature and object of proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense" to be competent to stand trial); Mathenia v. Delo, 975 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir.
1992) (finding mental retardation alone is insufficient to support diminished-capacity defense),
cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3652 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1993) (No. 92-7457); Woods v. Dugger, 923
F.2d 1454, 1455 (11 th Cir. 1991) (finding mentally retarded murderer had the mental capacity
to appreciate criminality of his conduct), cert. denied sub nom. Singletary v. Woods, - U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 407, 116 L. Ed. 2d 355 (1991); McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 859
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (Miller, J., dissenting) (arguing that limited mental capacity exempts no one
from criminal responsibility unless mental disability makes it impossible from knowing act was
wrong). In McDonald, the court argued that a person who deliberately chooses to do a known
criminal act, although the individual's mental capacity is impaired, should not be excused from
criminal responsibility from the criminal act. McDonald, 312 F.2d at 854. Furthermore, if the
defendant is able to understand the criminality of his actions, then he is sane in the legal sense,
even though he may have some mental disability. Id.; see also Pinski, 163 S.W.2d at 787-88
(finding requisite "mental capacity" sufficient to excuse commission of crime is defendant's
inability to distinguish right from wrong and not subnormal mental ability); Johnson, 290
N.W. at 162 (finding feeble-minded defendant understood nature of criminal act and knew
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UNDERSTANDING THE MENTALLY RETARDED

"Mental Retardation" Defined

Before determining whether a mentally retarded individual should be exempt from the death penalty, it is imperative to understand the precise definition of mental retardation. The early definitions of mental retardation
were quite similar to the definitions of the twentieth century. 52 In 1895, one
of the first widely-accepted definitions of mental retardation defined mental
retardation as a "[m]ental deficiency, depending upon imperfect development, or disease of the nervous system, dating from birth or from early infancy, previous to the evolution of the mental facilities."' 53 However, as the
rudiments of standardized testing were being formulated, as well as popularized, definitions of mental retardation became vague, imprecise, and based
solely on intelligence-test scores.54 Noting the fallibility of the I.Q. as a diagnostic instrument, experts in the field of psychology began to be concerned

difference between right and wrong); Wartena, 5 N.E. at 23 (holding weakness of mind does

not excuse commission of crime).
52. Before standardized testing, early definition of mental retardation focused on visible
defects such as how the person functions in society. The visible defects requirement is contained in the present definition of mental as "deficits in adaptive behavior." R.C. SCHEERENBERGER, A HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION 110 (1983). The first definition in 1877 of
mental retardation adopted by the American Association on Mental Deficiency was the
following:
Idiocy and imbecility are conditions in which there is want of natural or harmonious
development of mental, active, and moral powers of the individual affected, usually associated with some visible defect or infirmity of the physical organization and functional
anomalies, expressed in various forms and degrees of disordered vital action, in defect or
absence of one or more of the special sense, in irregular or uncertain volition, in dullness,
or absence of sensibility and perception.
Id. But see AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 28 (3d ed. rev. 1987) (defining mental retardation as condition of
"significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in
adaptive behavior and manifested during the early developmental period").
53. See R.C. SCHEERENBERGER, A HISTORY Of MENTAL RETARDATION 110 (1983)
(stating late nineteenth-century definition of mental retardation).
54. See ALA. CODE § 15-24-2(3) (Supp. 1992) (defining mental retardation based on behavior and intellectual functioning as determined by standardized intelligence tests); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie Supp. 1992) (stating I.Q. of 70 or below shall be presumptive evidence of retardation for capital-sentencing purposes); Snow v. State, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959,
962 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (interpreting I.Q. scores as "crude barometers" of intelligence);
ROBERT M. ALLEN & ARNOLD D. CORTAZZO, PSYCHOSOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS
AND PROBLEMS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 19 (1970) (asserting that early classification of
mental retardation emphasized intellectual ability); RITA WICKS-NELSON & ALLEN C.
ISRAEL, BEHAVIOR DISORDERS OF CHILDHOOD 239 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing origins of I.Q.
tests). I.Q. testing originated in the early 1900s when school children were tested for special
education purposes. Id. At that time, intelligence was considered to be an "individual, inherent. and stable characteristic." Id.
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about the use of I.Q. scores as a unitary measure of mental retardation. 55 In
response to this predicament, the American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD) 56 proposed a definition of mental retardation in hopes of
alleviating the problems that had developed with the use of I.Q. scores as a

55. Cf Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 n.9 (1985) (arguing that
mental retardation not defined by I.Q. alone); Snow, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 962 (interpreting I.Q.
scores as "crude barometers" of intelligence); Green v. State, 839 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex.
App.- Waco 1992, n.w.h.) (finding mentally retarded defendant's "street smarts" exceeded
his I.Q. of 54); Ex parte Williams, 833 S.W.2d 150,151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (finding individual with I.Q. score of 67 was not mentally retarded). Despite the recognized fallibility of
I.Q. scores as a unitary measure of mental retardation, five states have enacted statutes making
an I.Q. presumptive of mental retardation. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie Supp.
1992) (finding I.Q. of 70 or below presumptive evidence of mental retardation). See generally
RITA WIcKS-NELSON & ALLEN C. ISRAEL, BEHAVIOR DISORDERS OF CHILDHOOD 211 (2d
ed. 1991) (asserting that abuse of I.Q. tests resulted in adoption of greater emphasis on adaptive behavior). See also M. Honzik et al., The Stability of Mental Test Performance Between
Two and Eighteen Years, 17 J. EXPERIMENTAL EDUC. 309, 315 (1948) (emphasizing that observed fluctuations in children's I.Q. scores indicate need for utmost caution in predicative use
of a single score). In this study, a group of 252 children were given intelligence tests at specified ages between 21 months and 18 years. Id. at 315. The results of the study indicated that a
prediction of mental retardation based on a six-year I.Q. test would be inaccurate to the extent
of twenty I.Q. points for one out of three children. Id. Consequently, the authors of the study
assert that the findings of this study are of particular importance because "many plans for
individual children are made by schools, juvenile courts, and mental hygiene clinics on the
basis of a single mental test score." Id.; see also Edgar A. Doll, The Essentials of an Inclusive
Concept of Mental Deficiency, 46 AMER. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 214, 216 (1941) (noting
erroneous use of I.Q. as unitary measure of mental retardation). Dr. Doll proposed a new
definition for mental retardation so as to ameliorate the erroneous use of the I.Q. as the sole
criterion for mental retardation. Id. He contended that there were six criteria essential to a
definition of mental retardation: "(1) social incompetence, (2) due to mental subnormality, (3)
which has been developmentally arrested, (4) which obtains at maturity, (5) is of constitutional
origin, and (6) is essentially incurable." Id. at 215; see also Lloyd N. Yepsen, Defining Mental
Deficiency, 46 AMER. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 200, 203 (1941) (arguing that many people fail
to recognize fallibility of I.Q. as diagnostic instrument). In this article, Dr. Yepsen states that
an I.Q. is a concept that is readily understood by even the most uninformed layman. Id. He
recognizes that the determination of mental retardation is very dangerous when based solely
on a person's I.Q. Id. He further argues that the test used, the user of the test, the conditions
under which it is used, the age of the person examined, the chances of error in the calculation
of life age, test age, and the quotient itself, are often misunderstood by the individuals using the
I.Q. method of diagnosis. Id.
56. American courts have widely accepted the AAMD as an authority in mental retardation. E.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 308 n.1 (1989); Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. at 442 n.9; United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 724 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Crosby v.
Sultz, 592 A.2d 1337, 1341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). The AAMD was originally founded in 1876
as the Association of Medical Officers of American Institutions of Idiotic and Feeble-minded
Children. Today, the AAMD has approximately 10,000 members that serve in various capacities to help the mentally retarded. See generally CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION
5-10 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. ed., 1983) (discussing origin of AAMD).
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In 1959, the AAMD's proposed definition

was nationally accepted: "Mental retardation refers to the subaverage general intellectual functioning, which originates in the developmental period
and is associated with impairment in adaptive behavior.""8 Accordingly, an
individual is mentally retarded only when there is evidence of:

(1) subaverage general intellectual functioning;
(2) concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and
(3) onset during the early developmental period. 9
Today, virtually every state has enacted legislation adopting this three-part
definition of mental retardation.'

57. See ALAN S. KAUFMAN, INTELLIGENT TESTING WITH THE WISC-R 1 (1979) (arguing that intelligence does not define whole person); RITA WICKS-NELSON & ALLEN C.
ISRAEL, BEHAVIOR DISORDERS OF CHILDHOOD 211 (2d ed. 1991) (asserting that abuse of
I.Q. tests led to greater emphasis on adaptive behavior analysis in determination of mental
retardation). In Kaufman's discussion of the use of intelligence testing, he argues for a middleground approach to the use of I.Q. scores. Id. at 2. He contends, "[c]urrent court cases and
pending legislation ...may ultimately lead to a moratorium on intelligence testing. Id. at 1-2;
see also Lloyd L. Yepsen, Defining Mental Deficiency, 46 AMER. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 200,
205 (1941) (discussing AAMD formulation of proposed definition of mental retardation).
58. See CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 1 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. ed.,
1983). American courts have overwhelmingly adopted the AAMD's definition verbatim of
mental retardation. E.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 308 n. 1; CleburneLiving Center, Inc., 473 U.S. at
442 n.9; Markosyan v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1991) (text in WESTLAW); Brown v.
Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 948 F.2d 268, 270 (6th Cir. 1991); Paloulian v. Sullivan,
919 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1990) (text in WESTLAW); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 924 n.3
(6th Cir. 1990); see also AMA HANDBOOK ON MENTAL RETARDATION 7 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. & George Tarjan, M.D. eds., 1987) (defining mental retardation); David A. Davis,
Executing the Mentally Retarded: The Status of FloridaLaw, 65 FLA. BAR J. 12, 13 (1991)
(recognizing AAMD's definition of mental retardation).
59. CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION I (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. ed.,
1983); see Stripling v. State, 401 S.E.2d 500, 504 (Ga. 1991) (enumerating three crucial elements of mental retardation); Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339, 346 (Ga. 1989) (enumerating
elements of mental retardation); see also ROBERT W. CONLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF MENTAL
RETARDATION 7 (1973) (discussing three crucial elements of AAMD's definition of mental
retardation as: (1)subaverage intelligence (2) originating from birth or childhood (3) social
incompetence); GUNNAR DYBWAD, CHALLENGES IN MENTAL RETARDATION 29-40 (1964)
(discussing AAMD's required elements in development retardation throughout formative
years of children).
60. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-551(26) (Supp. 1992) (defining "mental retardation" as "condition involving subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior manifested before age eighteen"); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1001.20(a) (Deering 1983) (defining mentally retarded as "condition of significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the developmental period"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § l-Ig (West 1983)
(defining mental retardation as significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during developmental
period); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5530 (Michie Supp. 1992) (defining "mentally retarded
person" as "person with significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, existing con-
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currently with deficits in adaptive behavior"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 393.063(41) (West Supp.
1993) (defining "retardation" as "significantly subaverage general intelligence functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from
conception to age 18"); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(3) (Michie 1992) (defining "mentally
retarded" as having significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning resulting in or
associated with impairments in adaptive behavior which manifested during developmental period); HAW. REV. STAT. § 333F-1 (Supp. 1991) (defining "mental retardation" as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning resulting in or associated with concurrent
moderate, severe, or profound impairments in adaptive behavior and manifested during the
developmental period"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2) (Michie 1990) (defining "seriously mentally retarded defendant" as person with "significant subaverage intellectual functioning existing concurrently with substantial deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested
during developmental period"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-381(28) (West 1989) (defining
"mental retardation" as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested during developmental period");
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 5001(3) (West Supp. 1992) (defining "mental retardation"
as a "condition of significantly subaverage intellectual functioning resulting in or associated
with concurrent impairments in adaptive behavior and manifested during developmental period"); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412 (1990) (defining "mentally retarded" as "a developmental disability that is evidenced by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and
impairment in the adaptive behavior of an individual"); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-61 (1985)
(defining "mentally retarded person" as any person (i) who has been diagnosed as having significantly subaverage intellectual functioning existing concurrently with demonstrated deficits
in adaptive behavior); Mo. REV. STAT. § 630.005(22) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (defining "mental
retardation" as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning which: (a) originates
before age eighteen; and (b) is associated with a significant impairment in adaptive behavior");
NEV. REV. STAT. § 433.174 (1991) (defining "mental retardation" as "significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the developmental period"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171-A:2(XIV) (1991)
(defining "mental retardation" as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested during the developmental period"); N.J. REV. STAT. § 39:4-207.2 (1990) (defining mental retardation in context of
motor vehicle statute as a "person in a state of significant subnormal intellectual development
with reduction of social competence which state shall have existed prior to adolescence and is
expected to be of lifelong duration"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27B-1-1 (Michie 1992) (defining
"mentally retarded" as including "any person with significant subaverage general intellectual
functioning and deficits in adaptive behavior"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-1-101(15) (Michie
1984) (defining "mentally retarded individual or mentally deficient individual" as "an individual who has significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with
deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested during the developmental period"); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003(13) (Vernon 1992) (defining "mental retardation"
as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in
adaptive behavior and originates during the developmental period"); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 62A-5-101(6) (1992) (defining "mental retardation" as "significant, subaverage general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested
during the developmental period as defined in the current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by American Psychiatric Association"); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9302(1) (Supp. 1992) (defining "mentally retarded person" as "any person who has been diagnosed as having significantly subaverage intellectual functioning which
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has been manifested prior to the age of 19 and which exists concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior"); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-1 (Michie 1992) (defining "mental retardation" as
substantial subaverage general intellectual functioning which originates during development
period and is associated with impairment in adaptive behavior); W. VA. CODE § 27-1-3 (1992)
(defining "mental retardation" as significantly subaverage intellectual functioning which
manifests itself in a person during his developmental period and which is characterized by his
inadequacy in adaptive behavior"); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-102(11) (Supp. 1992)
(defining "developmental disability" as "a disability that is manifested before the person
reaches twenty-two years of age, which constitutes a substantial handicap to the affected individual... result[ing] in impairment of general intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior");
D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1902(2) (1981) (defining "at least moderately mentally retarded" as person who is "impaired in adaptive behavior to a moderate, severe or profound degree and functioning at the moderate, severe, or profound intellectual level in accordance with standard
measurements"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, para. 1-116 (Smith-Hurd 1991) (defining
"mental retardation" as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning which exists
concurrently with impairment in adaptive behavior and which originates before the age of 18
years"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 222.2 (5) (West 1985) (defining "mental retardation" as a term to
describe "children and adults who as a result of inadequately developed intelligence are significantly impaired in ability to learn or to adapt to the demands of society"); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-4623(5) (Supp. 1992) (defining "mentally retarded" as "having significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning.., to an extent which substantially impairs one's capacity to
appreciate the criminality of one's conduct or to conform one's conduct to the requirements of
law"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1205 (Supp. 1992) (defining developmental disability). The Nebraska statute's definition is rather lengthy; it defines developmental disability as meaning
mental retardation which
(a) is attributable to mental or physical impairment other than a mental or physical impairment caused solely by mental illness; (b) [i]s manifested before the age of twenty-two
years; (c) [i]s likely to continue indefinitely; and (d) [r]esults in: (i) [i]n the case of a person
under three years of age, at least one developmental delay; or (ii) [i]n the case of person
three years of age or older, a substantial limitation in three or more of the following areas
of major life activity, as appropriate for the person's age: (A) [s]elf-care; (B) [r]eceptive
and expressive language development and use; (C) [Il]earning; (D) [m]obility; (E) [s]elfdirection; (F) [c]apacity for independent living; and (G) [e]conomic self-sufficiency.
Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5119.50(g) (Baldwin 1991) (defining "mental retardation" to mean "mental retardation so defined by appropriate clinical authorities to such extent
that a person so afflicted is incapable of managing himself and his affairs, but shall not include
mental illness"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1408(A) (West Supp. 1993) (defining mentally
retarded person). The Oklahoma statute's definition is very detailed and defines mentally retarded person as
a person afflicted with mental defectiveness from birth or from an early age to such extent
that he is incapable of managing himself or his affairs, who, for his own welfare or welfare
of others or of the community, requires supervision, control, or care and who is not mentally ill or of unsound mind to such an extent as to require his certification to an institution for the mentally ill.
Id.; see also S.C. CODE § 44-23-10(25) (1987) (defining mentally retarded person). The South
Carolina provides an equally detailed definition of a mentally retarded person and defines such
person as follows:
any person, other than a mentally ill person primarily in need of mental health services,
whose inadequately developed or impaired intelligence and adaptive level of behavior require for his benefit, or that of the public, special training, education, supervision, treat-
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on an intelligence test.6" For an individual to be considered subaverage in
intellectual functioning, the obtained I.Q. score must be greater than two
standard deviations below mean performance for the chronological age involved or, in simpler terms, the individual must obtain an I.Q. of seventy or
below.6 2
The second part of the definition of mental retardation, deficits in adaptive
behavior, is the unique and essential feature of this definition.63 Deficits in
ment, care or control in his home or in a service facility or program under the control and
management of the South Carolina Mental Retardation Department.
Id.
61. CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 11 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. ed.,
1983); see CONN. GEN. STAT. Ann. § l-lg(b) (1988) (defining "intellectual functioning" as
results obtained by "assessment with one or more of a individually administered general intelligence tests"). American courts have overwhelmingly acknowledged that intelligence tests can
determine intellectual functioning. See, e.g., State v. Shields, 593 A.2d 986, 1008 (Del. Super.
1990) (finding I.Q. score as indicative of "intellectual functioning"); Stripling, 401 S.E.2d at
504 (finding I.Q. score indicative of "intellectual functioning"); Wilson v. State, 813 S.W.2d
833, 844 (Mo. 1991) (finding I.Q. score indicative of "intellectual functioning"). See generally
James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 414, 422 (1985) (recognizing AAMD's upper boundary of mental retardation
at I.Q. of 70).
62. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 405, § 80-2-3(l)(1)(A) (1991) (defining "mental retardation"
as general intellectual functioning that is two or more standard deviations below mean, concurrent with impairment of adaptive behavior that is two or more standard deviations below
mean). See, e.g., State v. Kinner, 398 So. 2d 1360, 1363 n.2 (Fla. 1981) (acknowledging "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" as two or more standard deviations
from mean score on standardized intelligence test); State v. Grandy, 623 P.2d 666, 670 (Or. Ct.
App. 1981) (acknowledging "significantly subaverage" as intelligence test score that is two or
more standard deviations below mean for test); Williams v. State, 667 S.W.2d 783, 790 (Tx.
App.- Amarillo 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 663 S.W.2d 832 (rex. Crim. App. 1984) (acknowledging "subaverage general intellectual functioning" as standardized test score of two or
more standard deviations below age-group mean for test used); ROBERT M. ALLEN & ARNOLD D. CORTAZZO, PSYCHOSOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF

MENTAL RETARDATION 26-27 (1970) (discussing behavioral classifications of intelligence).
See generally AMA HANDBOOK ON MENTAL RETARDATION 8 (Herbert J.Grossman, M.D.

& George Tarjan, M.D. eds., 1987) (defining "significantly subaverage" as I.Q. of 70 or lower);
David A. Davis, Executing the Mentally Retarded: The Status ofFloridaLaw, 65 FLA. BAR J.
12, 13 (1991) (defining significant subaverage general intellectual functioning as I.Q. of 70 or
below).
63. CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION II (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. ed.,

1983); see, e.g., Money v. Krall, 180 Cal. Rptr. 376, 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (arguing that
uncertainty of I.Q. scores requires multi-factor diagnostic approach when defining mentally
retarded individuals); Stripling, 401 S.E.2d at 504 (acknowledging impairments in adaptive
behavior as essential); Grandy, 623 P.2d at 670 (finding defendant's adaptive behavior was
significantly impaired); see also AMA HANDBOOK ON MENTAL RETARDATION 8 (Herbert J.

Grossman, M.D. & George Tarjan, M.D. eds., 1987) (defining "impairments in adaptive behavior"). The AMA definition reads "significant limitation in individual's ability to meet standards of maturation, learning, personal independence, and/or social responsibility expected of
persons of same age level and cultural group, as determined by clinical assessment and stan-
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adaptive behavior are exhibited in an individual's ability to function properly
in society, namely, meeting the normal standards of learning, showing personal independence, and demonstrating communication and daily-living
skills expected from his or her age group." Unlike intellectual functioning,
adaptive behavior is not quantifiable, but is discretionary and subject to manipulation.65 The inclusion of this criterion in the definition of "mentally
retarded" requires the individual's obtained I.Q. score to correlate with the
dardized tests. Id. Before I.Q. tests were created, mental retardation was based on individual's behavior in society. See JANE R. MERCER, LABELING THE MENTALLY RETARDED,
CLINICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM PERSPECTIVES ON MENTAL RETARDATION 131 (1973) (argu-

ing that individual's adaptive behavior is most ancient and durable basis for classifying persons
as mentally retarded); David A. Davis, Executing the Mentally Retarded: The Status of Florida Law, 65 FLA. BAR J. 12, 13 (1991) (arguing I.Q. is not by itself determinative of mental
retardation).
64. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 28-29 (3d ed. 1987). Numerous state statutes have defined "deficits

in adaptive behavior." See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. Ann. § l-lg(b) (West 1988) (defining
"adaptive behavior" as "effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards
of personal independence and social responsibility expected for the individual's age and cultural group"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-12b01(a) (1984) (defining "adaptive behavior" as "effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and
social responsibility expected of that person's age, cultural group and community"); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 28-381(1) (West 1983) (defining "adaptive behavior" as "effectiveness or degree
with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected for age and cultural group"); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003(1)
(Vernon 1992) (defining "adaptive behavior" as "effectiveness with or degree to which a person
meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of the person's
age and cultural group"); see Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. at 442 n.9 (citing definition
of "deficits in adaptive behavior" as "limitations on general ability to meet the standards of
maturation, learning, personal independence, and social responsibility expected for an individual's age level and cultural group"); see also CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 12

(Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. ed., 1983) (defining adaptive behavior as "significant limitations
in an individual's effectiveness in meeting the standards of maturation, learning, personal independence, and/or social responsibility that are expected for his or her age level and cultural
group as determined by clinical assessment and usually standardized scales"). See generally
James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 414, 422 (1985) (discussing AAMD's definition of adaptive behavior); David
A. Davis, Executing the Mentally Retarded: The Status of FloridaLaw, 65 FLA. BAR J. 12, 13
(1991) (defining adaptive behavior as inability to cope with demands of society).
65. See Money, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 383 n.3 (noting that scales have been designed to quantify adaptive behavior, but none is valid); People v. Ward, 338 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ill. 1975)
(conceding that I.Q. scores vary depending on subjective determination of party administering
test); Fleming, 386 S.E.2d at 346 (quoting that adaptive behavior is term of art); LARRY
HARDY ET AL., OBJECTIVE BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SEVERELY AND MODERATELY MENTALLY HANDICAPPED: THE OBA v (198 1) (asserting that assessment in adaptive

behavior needs to be objective). The authors of this article propose a behavioral checklist to
assess individuals' adaptive behavior. Id. The proposed checklist provides an objective assessment of severely and moderately retarded individual's self-care, prevocational skills, and sheltered work performance. Id.; see also James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally
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practical impairments that this individual experiences in life.66 Last, an individual must exhibit both subaverage intellectual functioning and deficits in
adaptive behavior during the developmental period,67 which extends from
birth to approximately eighteen years of age.6" In sum, it is imperative that

Retarded CriminalDefendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 422 (1985) (describing adaptive
behavior as "term of art").
66. See Fleming, 386 S.E.2d at 346 (arguing "adaptive behavior" requirement is included
in determination of mental retardation to give definition of mental retardation's practical impact); cf Levy v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., 399 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979)
(holding that without adaptive behavior, I.Q. does not constitute substantial evidence of
mental retardation); Williams, 833 S.W.2d at 151 (finding mental retardation cannot be determined solely from I.Q. tests); see JANE R. MERCER, LABELING THE MENTALLY RETARDED,
CLINICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM PERSPECTIVES ON MENTAL RETARDATION 133 (1973) (arguing that criteria of impaired adaptive behavior must be included in definition of mentally retarded so as to supplement standardized test score with information of self-help and social
behavior); James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded CriminalDefendants, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 422 (1985) (noting inclusion of adaptive behavior in definition of
mental retardation so that individual's I.Q. has some practical meaning).
67. CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 12 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. ed.,
1983); cf Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1185 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding no evidence of
mental retardation in defendant because disability did not develop before age 22), cert. denied
sub nom. Williams v. Shalala, 61 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-6620); Brown,
948 F.2d at 270 (remanding case to determine whether claimant's subaverage intellectual development and deficits in adaptive behavior occurred prior to his eighteenth birthday). See
generally AMA HANDBOOK ON MENTAL RETARDATION 8 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. &
George Tarijan, M.D. eds., 1987) (defining "developmental period" as period between conception and 18th birthday). The handbook also notes that deficits in development may be manifested by "slow, arrested, or incomplete development resulting from brain damage,
degenerative processes in the central nervous system, or regression from previously normal
states due to psychological factors." Id.; see also RITA WICKS-NELSON & ALLEN C. ISRAEL,
BEHAVIOR DISORDERS OF CHILDHOOD 211 (2d ed. 1991) (requiring subaverage intelligence
and deficits in adaptive behavior before eighteenth birthday).
68. CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 13 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. ed.,
1983). Numerous state legislatures and courts have accepted that both subaverage intellect
and deficits in adaptive behavior must occur during the individual's developmental period.
However, states have disagreed on the definition of developmental period. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-551(22) (West 1991) (requiring conditions of mental retardation to have
manifested before age 18); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-lg(b) (West 1988) (requiring characteristics of mental retardation be displayed during time between birth and 18th birthday); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 393.063(41) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring "retardation" to have manifested during period from conception to age 18); Mo. REV. STAT. § 630.005(22)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992)
(requiring conditions of mental retardation to have originated before age 18). But see COLO.
REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-102(10)(a) (Bradford 1992) (requiring "developmental disability" to
manifest before person reaches 22 years of age); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412 (Michie 1992)
(requiring conditions of mental retardation to have manifested before individual attains age of
22); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1205(2)(b) (R.S. Supp. 1992) (requiring "developmental disability"
be manifested before age of 22 years); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9302(1) (Supp. 1989) (requiring conditions of mental retardation to have manifested prior to age of 19); Williams, 970 F.2d
at 1185 (finding that mental retardation did not exist in defendant because his disability did
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an individual meet all three criteria before being considered mentally retarded.6 9 Thus, a person with an I.Q. as low as fifty-five who displays no
deficits in adaptive behavior should not be considered mentally retarded.7"
B.

Classifications
Mentally retarded individuals are not a homogenous group. 7 ' Mentally

not develop before age 22). See generally James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally
Retarded CriminalDefendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 422-23 (1985) (arguing that if
individual is both subaverage in intellect and deficient in adaptive behavior, it should matter
little whether onset occurred before age 18).
69. Cf Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. at 442 n.9 (noting that mental retardation is
not defined by individual's I.Q. alone); Williams, 970 F.2d at 1185 (holding that manifestations
of mental retardation must exists before age 22 to receive disability benefits for mental retardation); Brown, 948 F.2d at 271 (remanding case to determine whether claimant's subaverage
intellectual development and deficits in adaptive behavior occurred prior to his 18th birthday);
Williams, 833 S.W.2d at 151 (finding mental retardation cannot be determined solely from I.Q.
tests). See generally LEWIS R. AIKEN, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING AND ASSESSMENT 165 (4th
ed. 1982) (arguing I.Q. score not determinative of mental retardation). Aiken argues that the
diagnosis of a mentally retarded individual requires the assessment of such factors as "motor
skills, academic and vocational achievement and social and emotional maturity." Id. These
factors are assessed by an informal analysis of the individual's child history. Id.; see also RONALD W. CONLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 7 (1973) (arguing that individual must manifest subaverage intelligence and deficits in adaptive behavior during their
childhood to be considered mentally retarded).
70. Cf Money, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (requiring multifactor-diagnostic approach when
defining mentally retarded individuals); Stripling, 401 S.E.2d at 504 (requiring impairments in
adaptive behavior); Grandy, 623 P.2d at 670 (requiring impairments in adaptive behavior); see
JANE R. MERCER, LABELING THE MENTALLY RETARDED, CLINICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM
PERSPECTIVES ON MENTAL RETARDATION 133 (1973) (arguing that adaptive behavior is
mandatory for valid diagnosis of mental retardation); David A. Davis, Executing the Mentally
Retarded: The Status of Florida Law, 65 FLA. BAR J. 12, 13 (1991) (concluding I.Q. is not
determinative of mental retardation).
71. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 338 (1989) (holding mentally retarded defendants should not be categorically excluded from death penalty because such individuals are not
homogeneous but instead have "diverse capacities and life experiences"); Fleming v. Zant, 386
S.E.2d 339, 346 (Ga. 1989) (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing mentally retarded individuals are
not homogeneous). Contra Penry, 492 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing mentally
retarded individuals are homogeneous group because every mentally retarded individual must
have substantial disability in cognitive ability and adaptive behavior, regardless of degree of
retardation). See AMA HANDBOOK ON MENTAL RETARDATION 12 (Herbert J. Grossman,
M.D. & George Tarjan, M.D. eds., 1987) (stating mentally retarded individuals do not fall
neatly into categories but instead "vary widely in degree of intellectual capacity and social
adaptability"); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY
RETARDED AND THE LAW 215-16 (Michael Kindred et al. eds., 1976) (stating common misconception that mentally retarded persons form homogeneous group). Kane argues that the
mentally retarded are a diverse group in that the profoundly retarded are at one end of the
spectrum, requiring almost constant care and supervision, while the mildly mentally retarded
are at the other end of the spectrum, requiring virtually no care or supervision and are capable
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retarded persons, like any other group of individuals, vary enormously in
talent, aptitude, personality, achievement, and temperament.72 Given the

variance in abilities, mentally retarded persons are generally classified according to severity or degree of mental retardation.7 3 The most widely used
classification system is the one suggested by the AAMD, 74 a system that
classifies mental retardation as mild, moderate, severe, or profound, based
on an individual's score on an intelligence test." Current intelligent tests
of a normal life. Id. See generally John Blume & David Brook, Sentencing the Mentally Retardedto Death: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REV. 725, 732-34 (1988) (finding
mentally retarded as homogenous group will lead to stereotyping and discrimination).
72. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 338 (arguing that although mentally retarded individuals share
some common characteristics, they exhibit varying degrees of mental deficiency). Compare
Masonite Corp. v. Mitchell, 699 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (finding claimant's I.Q.
of 50 was neither impairment nor disability) and Roby v. Tarlton Corp., 728 S.W.2d 586, 589
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (finding mildly mentally retarded claimant held regular job, working 40
hours per week) with Person v. Department of Social Servs., 453 N.W.2d 390, 392 (Neb. 1990)
(finding mentally retarded person incapable of dressing, bathing, toileting, and eating by himself) and Rine v. Irisari, 420 S.E.2d 541, 543 (W. Va. 1992) (finding mentally retarded person
suffered from cerebral palsy, left hemiplegia, grand mal and petit mal seizures, and no ability
to speak meaningfully). See also Michael S. Sorgen, The ClassificationProcess and Its Consequences, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 215, 215-16 (Michael Kindred et al. eds., 1973) (arguing that mentally retarded individuals are diverse); James W. Ellis
& Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded CriminalDefendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414,
427 (1985) (arguing that any attempt to categorize mentally retarded risks false stereotyping
and, therefore, demands great caution).
73. See Edmunds v. Edwards, 287 N.W.2d 420, 422-23 (Neb. 1980) (classifying mental
retardation by degree); cf Penry, 492 U.S. at 338 (acknowledging varying degrees of mental
retardation); Conservatorship of Valerie N. v. Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 762 n.3 (Cal. 1985)
(classifying mental retardation into four categories); State v. Bricker, 581 A.2d 9, 16 (Md.
1990) (noting mentally retarded individuals are classified into four categories); see also AMA
HANDBOOK ON MENTAL RETARDATION 12-13 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. & George
Tarjan, M.D. eds., 1987) (finding mentally retarded individuals vary in degree of intellectual
capacity and social adaptability); RITA WICKS-NELSON & ALLEN C. ISRAEL, BEHAVIOR DISORDERS OF CHILDHOOD 218-19 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing AAMD's classification system regarding degrees of mental retardation).
74. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 n.9 (1985) (acknowledging
AAMD's classification of mentally retarded into four distinct categories); United States v.
Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 724 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (acknowledging AAMD classifications of
mentally retarded); Crosby v. Sultz, 592 A.2d 1337, 1341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (recognizing
AAMD classifications of mentally retarded). But see AMA HANDBOOK ON MENTAL RETARDATION 12-13 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. & George Tarjan, M.D. eds., 1987). The AMA
breaks the mentally retarded population into two basic groups. The first group usually suffer
from a central nervous-system disease, and have I.Q.s in the moderately retarded range and
below. Id. The second group, comprising of 75% of the mentally retarded population, usually
have no detectable physical signs or laboratory evidence of mental retardation. Id. at 13. This
group usually scores on intelligence tests in the mildly retarded range. Id.
75. CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 13 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. ed.,
1983); see Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. at 442 n.9 (recognizing AAMD's four classifications of mental retardation); Brown v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 948 F.2d 268, 270
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are designed so that two-thirds of the population will obtain an I.Q. of 85 to
115, the highest 1% will obtain a score
of 135 or above, and the lowest 1%
76
below.
or
65
of
I.Q.
an
will obtain
The first classification of mental retardation is "mild." An individual who
falls within this level has an I.Q. score between fifty and seventy. 7 In this
category, a person's intellect is not the same as that of the average person,
but the person is not forever bound to a nonfunctional status. 78 To the cas(6th Cir. 1991) (listing four classifications for mental retardation); see also LEWIS R. AIKEN,
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING AND ASSESSMENT 165 (4th ed. 1982) (illustrating four classifications of mental retardation); ROBERT M. ALLEN & ARNOLD D. CORTAZZO, PSYCHOSOCIAL
AND EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 26 (1970) (discussing levels of measured intelligence).
76. See DAVID WECHSLER, MANUAL FOR THE WECHSLER INTELLIGENCE SCALE FOR
CHILDREN - REVISED 4 (1974) (discussing quantitative interpretation of I.Q. scores of chil-

dren). The WISC-R is designed such that 50% of the population will obtain an I.Q. of 85 to
115. Id.; see also DAVID WECHSLER, WECHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE - REVISED
27 (1981) (discussing quantitative interpretation of WAIS-R for adults). See generally ISSAM
B. AMARYM, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED - DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED TO TREATMENT AND EDUCATION 13 (1980) (discussing I.Q. and way in which tests
designed).
77. CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 13 (Herbert J. Grossman M.D. ed.,

1983). Courts have consistently categorized individuals with I.Q. scores between 50 and 60
"mildly" mentally retarded according to the AAMD's classification. See, e.g., Spruiell v.
Robinson, 582 So. 2d 508, 510 (Ala. 1991) (classifying I.Q. of 67 as "mild" mental retardation); State v. Austin, 596 So. 2d 598, 602 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (finding I.Q. of 65 "mild"
retardation); O.M. v. State, 595 So. 2d 514, 522 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (categorizing I.Q. of
70 as "mild" mental retardation); People v. Lara, 432 P.2d 202, 211 (Cal. 1967) (classifying
I.Q. of 65 to 71 as mild mental retardation), cert denied sub nom. Lara v. California, 392 U.S.
945 (1968); State v. Moore, 364 S.E.2d 648, 653 (N.C. 1988) (recognizing I.Q. of 51 as lowest
level of mild retardation); but see Duhamel v. Collins, 955 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1992) (categorizing I.Q. of 56 as "moderate" mental retardation). See generally HERBERT C. GUNZBURG, SOCIAL COMPETENCE AND MENTAL HANDICAP: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL
EDUCATION 26 (1973) (classifying I.Q. scores ranging from 55 to 69 on Wechsler intelligence
test or between 68 and 83 on Stanford-Binet type of test as "mild" mental retardation).
78. See e.g., Mathenia v. Delo, 975 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding defendant with

I.Q. of approximately 70 had requisite level of comprehension to adequately waive his Miranda
rights), cert denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3652 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1993) (No. 92-7457); Markosyan v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1991) (text in WESTLAW) (finding I.Q. of 52 failed to meet
impairment requirements for permanent-disability benefits); Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d
1472, 1481-82 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding "mildly" mentally retarded defendant competent to
stand trial); Kharmandaryan v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1991) (text in WESTLAW)
(finding claimant with I.Q. of 68 not permanently disabled and not deserving of disability
benefits); Ellison v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 534, 536 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding claimant with I.Q.
between 60 and 69 not entitled to social security disability benefits); Masonite Corp., 699
S.W.2d at 411 (finding claimant's I.Q. of 50 was not impairment or disability giving rise to
benefits under Second Injury Fund Liability); Stripling v. State, 401 S.E.2d 500, 503 (Ga.
1991) (finding mildly retarded defendant had capacity to distinguish between right and
wrong); Roby, 728 S.W.2d at 589 (finding claimant with I.Q. between 59 and 67 not able to
receive disability benefits); State v. Stokes, 352 S.E.2d 653, 657 (N.C. 1987) (finding mildly
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ual observer, these people are often not noticed as being mentally retarded. 79

At the present time, virtually all individuals with mild mental retardation
can live successfully in the community. 0 An individual with an I.Q. ranging from thirty-five to forty-nine falls into the second classification of "moderate.""1 Virtually all mildly and moderately retarded persons have the

retarded defendant able to control his behavior); Green v. State, 839 S.W.2d 935, 940 (rex.
Crim. App. 1992, pet. refd) (finding mentally retarded criminal's "street smarts" exceeded his
I.Q. of 54). See generally ROBERT M. ALLEN & ARNOLD D. CORTAZZO, PSYCHOSOCIAL AND
EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 29 (1970) (discussing
classifications of behavioral expectations of mentally retarded individuals at three age levels:
preschool, school age, and adult).
79. See Brown, 948 F.2d at 270 (finding mildly mental retarded individuals have minimal
impairment in sensorimotor areas, and not distinguishable from normal children); Stokes, 352
S.E.2d at 657 (finding that mildly retarded defendant showed no visible signs of disability in
controlling his behavior); State v. DeLeonardo, 340 S.E.2d 350, 353 (N.C. 1986) (finding
mildly retarded person with I.Q. of 55 competent to testify against sexual offender). In DeLeonardo, the evidence indicated that although the witness was mentally retarded, he did not
show visible signs of mental retardation. Id. The court found he was able to write in cursive,
read, knew his home address, and knew his principal's name. Id. Additionally, he knew that
it was wrong to lie. Id.; see SPENCER A. RATHUS, UNDERSTANDING CHILD DEVELOPMENT
374 (1988)) (noting difficulty distinguishing mildly mentally retarded individuals). See generally RITA WICKS-NELSON & ALLEN C. ISRAEL, BEHAVIOR DISORDERS OF CHILDHOOD 219
(2d ed. 1991) (describing mildly retarded as educable).
80. See State v. Lapia, 522 A.2d 272, 274 (Conn. 1987) (finding mildly retarded defendant able to recollect details and facts, differentiate difference between truth and lie); Stripling,
401 S.E.2d at 503 (finding mildly retarded defendant had capacity to distinguish between right
and wrong); Roby, 728 S.W.2d at 589 (rejecting claimant's request for disability benefits);
Righter v. State, 752 P.2d 416, 420 (Wyo. 1988) (finding both mild mentally retarded defendants able to understand difference between having sexual intercourse with woman, as opposed
to man). In Roby, the court denied disability benefits to claimant who had an I.Q. between 59
and 67 based on evidence that claimant held regular job. Roby, 728 S.W.2d at 587-89; see also
Masonite Corp., 699 S.W.2d at 411 (finding claimant's I.Q. of 50 was not impairment or disability). But see Warren v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 501 So. 2d 706, 708 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (finding mildly retarded mother incapable of providing her children with
stable, long-term environment). In Warren, a psychologist testified that the mother was unable
"to provide effective management of her children's behavior, to meet their basic safety and
physical needs, and to provide for their need for mastery, stimulation, self-esteem, belongingness and security." Id. See generally ROBERT M. ALLEN & ARNOLD D. CORTAZZO,
PSYCHOSOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 29
(1970) (discussing behavioral expectations of mentally retarded individuals at three age levels).

81. CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 13 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. ed.,
1983). Courts have recognized the classification of I.Q. scores ranging from thirty-five to
forty-nine as "moderate" mental retardation. See, e.g., Sharkey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 600
So.2d 701, 716 (La. Ct. App. 1992, writ denied) (classifying I.Q. ranging in forties as "moderate" mental retardation); In re Devone, 356 S.E.2d 389, 390 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (categorizing I.Q. of 41 in AAMD's "moderate" degree of mental retardation); Ex parte Goodman,
816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (granting writ of habeas corpus and classifying
applicant as "mildly" retarded from I.Q. of 56); Wootton v. State, 799 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tex.
App.- Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied) (classifying I.Q. of 45 as "moderate" mental retarda-
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ability to conform to the customs, habits, and standards of behavior in society and to do so independently of direction and guidance. 2 The third classification is "severe" mental retardation, which applies to individuals who
have I.Q. scores ranging from twenty to thirty-four.8 3 These individuals can
conform to daily routines and repetitive activities." Although they have the
capability to learn simple work skills, they are usually incapable of selfmaintenance.8 5 The last level of retardation is "profound," and describes

tion); Jenkins v. Winchester Dep't of Social Servs., 409 S.E.2d 16, 18 (Va. Ct. App. 1991)
(categorizing I.Q. of 49 as "moderate" mental retardation); see AMA HANDBOOK ON
MENTAL RETARDATION 15 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. & George Taijan, M.D. eds., 1987)
(finding that "moderately" retarded individuals can live satisfying and productive lives with
proper education). But see HERBERT C. GUNZBURG, SOCIAL COMPETENCE AND MENTAL
HANDICAP: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL EDUCATION 26 (1973) (classifying I.Q. scores between 40 and 54 on Wechsler scale and 36 to 51 on Stanford-Binet test as "moderate" mental
retardation).
82. Cf Peters v. Whitley, 942 F.2d 937, 942 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding "moderately" retarded rape victim competent to testify at trial), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 1220, 117
L. Ed. 2d 457 (1992); State v. Barnes, 740 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
mildly retarded defendant competent to stand trial and sane at time of criminal offense); SPENCER A. RATHUS & JEFFREY S. NEYID, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 491 (1991) (finding moderately retarded children capable of caring for themselves). See generally HERBERT C.
GUNZBURG, SOCIAL COMPETENCE AND MENTAL HANDICAP: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL EDUCATION 15-17 (1973) (discussing social competence of individuals classified as moderately mentally retarded).
83. CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 13 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. ed.,

1983). Courts have recognized AAMD's classification of I.Q. scores ranging from twenty to
thirty-four as "severe" mental retardation. See, e.g., McDonald's Sherwood Forest, Inc. v.
Dep't of Employment Security, 540 So. 2d 412, 413 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (classifying I.Q. of 30
as "severely" retarded); State v. Milbradt, 756 P.2d 620, 622 (Or. 1988) (classifying I.Q. of 25
as "severely" retarded); Barnett v. Bromwell, Inc. 366 S.E.2d 271, 273 (Va. Ct. App. 1988)
(categorizing I.Q. ranging from 20-49 as "severe" mental retardation); see AMA HANDBOOK
ON MENTAL RETARDATION 15 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. & George Tarjan, M.D. eds.,
1987) (finding "severe" mentally retarded individuals show most pronounced developmental

problems);

HERBERT C. GUNZBURG, SOCIAL COMPETENCE AND MENTAL HANDICAP: AN

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL EDUCATION 27 (1973) (classifying Wechsler I.Q. score between 25
and 39 and Stanford-Binet's score between 29 and 35 as indicating severe mental retardation).
84. See In re Grady, 405 A.2d 851, 855 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979) (noting ability of
severely retarded individual to attend education classes and benefit from sheltered workshop
training); In re Weberlist, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (finding severely
retarded individual able to understand simple commands and function in his apartment within
institution); see also ROBERT M. ALLEN & ARNOLD D. CORTAZZO, PSYCHOSOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 29 (1970) (observing that
severely retarded individual can conform to daily routines and repetitive activities); SPENCER
A. RATHUS, UNDERSTANDING CHILD DEVELOPMENT 374 (1988)) (finding severely retarded
individuals are able to conform to daily routines).
85. See Fagerquist v. Western Sun Aviation, 236 Cal. Rptr. 633, 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(finding "severely" mentally retarded individual unable to eat properly, had constant diarrhea,
and could not walk normally); Cramer v. Gillermina R., 178 Cal. Rptr. 69, 71 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982) (noting all appellants were "severely" retarded individuals and institutionalized);
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individuals who have an I.Q. below twenty. 6 These individuals will usually
benefit from physical activity, but are incapable of self-maintenance.8 7
C. Misconceptions
In today's society, a misconception exists that all mentally retarded persons are "profoundly" retarded. 8 However, 89% of all mentally retarded
persons fall in the "mildly" retarded range.8 9 In fact, only 1% of all menTartaglia v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 416 A.2d 608, 610 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) (noting "severely" retarded woman was institutionalized for majority of her life); see also ISSAM B.
AMARY, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED - DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED TO
TREATMENT AND EDUCATION 14 (1980) (discussing institutionalization of some "severely"
retarded persons). See generally ROBERT M. ALLEN & ARNOLD D. CORTAZZO,
PSYCHOSOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 29
(1970) (finding severely retarded individuals in need of continuing supervision).
86. CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 13 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. ed.,
1983). Courts have recognized the AAMD's classification of I.Q. scores below twenty as
"profound" mental retardation. See, e.g., Williams v. Macomber, 276 Cal. Rptr. 267, 268 n.2
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (classifying I.Q. below 20 as "profoundly" retarded); American Fed'n of
State & County Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. State, 529 N.E.2d 534, 536 (Ill.
1988) (classifying I.Q. below 10 as "profound" mental retardation); Barnett v. Bromwell, Inc., 358 S.E.2d
767, 770 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (classifying I.Q. of 0 to 19 as "idiot"); see also HERBERT C.
GUNZBURG, SOCIAL COMPETENCE AND MENTAL HANDICAP: AN INTRODUCTION TO SO-

CIAL EDUCATION 27 (1973) (finding that profoundly retarded score below 25 on Wechsler test
and below 20 on Stanford-Binet test).
87. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 (1982) (finding "profoundly" retarded
person could not talk nor could he care for himself); Williams, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 268 n.2
(discussing "profoundly" retarded individuals possess minimal capacity for sensorimotor functioning and need constant aid and supervision); American Fed'n of State & County Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO, 529 N.E.2d at 536 (stating "profoundly" retarded person required

assistance in performing basic daily-living functions). See generally ROBERT M.

ALLEN &
ARNOLD D. CORTAZZO, PSYCHOSOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF
MENTAL RETARDATION 29 (1970) (evaluating profoundly retarded individuals as incapable of
self-sustaining life); SPENCER A. RATHUS & JEFFREY S. NEVID, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY
492 (1991) (citing SPENCER A. RATHUS, UNDERSTANDING CHILD DEVELOPMENT 374

(1988)) (finding profoundly retarded individuals benefit from regular physical activity, but incapable of self-maintenance).
88. See PAUL R. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 23-26
(ACLU Handbook 1976) (discussing 1969 study of American attitudes toward mentally retarded revealing that more than half of people polled believed that institutionalization is best

for mentally retarded);

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE

MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 215-216 (Michael Kindred et al. eds., 1976)
(noting common misconception in belief that almost all mentally retarded persons are profoundly retarded and nonfunctional).
89. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 40 (3d. ed. 1980); see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.

432, 443 n.9 (1985) (finding "mild mental retardation" accounts for 89% of all mentally re-

tarded persons); cf Brown v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 948 F.2d 268, 270 (6th Cir.
1991) (finding approximately 85% of all mentally retarded are "mildly mentally retarded");

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

27

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 24 [2022], No. 4, Art. 12

1326

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:1299

tally retarded persons in the United States fall into the combined levels of
"severe" and "profound" retardation. 90 Numerous studies show that approximately 95% of all mentally retarded persons have the potential to be
economically productive members of society. 91 Moreover, experts in the
are capafield of mental retardation argue that all mentally retarded persons 92
retardation.
of
level
their
of
regardless
learning
and
ble of growth
Society's misconception that all mentally retarded individuals are profoundly retarded has led to the presumption in five states that all mentally
retarded criminal defendants are incapable of acting with the degree of cul-

Richard v. State, 842 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc) (finding I.Q. below 69
or 70 obtained by approximately 3% of population); see also SPENCER A. RATHUS & JEFFREY
S. NEVID, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 491 (1991) (stating approximately 85% of mentally retarded children in mildly retarded range). See generally RONALD W. CONLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 34-39 (1973) (discussing prevalence of mild mental
retardation in society); LAWRENCE A. KANE, JR., THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND
THE LAW 216 (1973) (finding 90% of all mentally retarded persons have I.Q. scores over 50,
placing them in mildly retarded category); David A. Davis, Executing the Mentally Retarded:
The Status of Florida Law, 65 FLA. BAR J. 12, 16 n.5 (1991) (stating 89% of all mentally
retarded persons as "mildly" retarded).
90. ISSAM B. AMARY, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED - DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED TO TREATMENT AND EDUCATION 15 (1980); cf Conservatorship of Valerie

N. v. Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 762 (Cal. 1985) (recognizing only 1% of all mentally retarded
individuals are "profoundly" retarded); see RONALD W. CONLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF
MENTAL RETARDATION 26-34 (1973) (discussing prevalence of "severe" mental retardation in
society); PAUL R. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 16 (ACLU

Handbook 1976) (asserting that only 5% of mentally retarded persons are classified as "severe" and "profound").
91. Cf Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1185 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding claimant's I.Q.
of 66 did not establish disability deserving of governmental benefits), cert. denied sub nom.
Williams v. Shalala, 61 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-6620); Kharmandaryan v.
Sullivan, 947 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1991) (text in WESTLAW) (finding claimant's I.Q. of 67
insufficient evidence of permanent impairment to receive disability benefits); Masonite Corp. v.
Mitchell, 699 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (finding claimant's I.Q. of 50 was not
impairment or disability to receive benefits under Second Injury Fund Liability); Roby v. Tarlton Corp., 728 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing claimant with I.Q. from 59
to 67 able to work 40 hours per week). See generally Philip Roos, Basic Facts About Mental
Retardation, in 1 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 17, 20-21 (Bruce J. Ennis & Paul R. Friedman eds., 1973) (discussing quantity of mentally retarded persons who are
able to be economically self-sufficient).
92. Cf State v. Lapia, 522 A.2d 272, 274 (Conn. 1987) (stating mild mentally retarded
competent to testify); In re Grady, 405 A.2d 851, 855 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979) (discussing severely retarded individual's ability to attend education classes and benefit from sheltered
workshop training); Smith v. State, 742 S.W.2d 847, 851 (Tex. App. - Austin 1987, no writ)
(finding mild mentally retarded defendant "knew what was going on" during his confession);
SPENCER A. RATHUS & JEFFREY S. NEVID, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 496 (1991) (finding

many moderately and severely retarded individuals capable of living outside institutions). See
generally PAUL R. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 17 (ACLU
Handbook 1976) (arguing that all mentally retarded individuals have some ability to learn).
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pability required for imposing the death penalty. 93 Mentally retarded persons should not be viewed as subhuman or diseased objects. 94 This type of
93. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992) (providing that death
penalty shall not be imposed on mentally retarded defendant); KY. REV. STAT. § 532.140
(Michie 1990) (exonerating severely mentally retarded offenders from death penalty); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412 (1989) (exempting mentally retarded defendants from death penalty); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 1991) (providing that penalty of death shall not
be imposed on any person who is mentally retarded); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1990)
(providing mentally retarded defendant shall not be sentenced to death); but see Woods v.
Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454, 1455 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding individual with I.Q. of 69 had mental
capacity to appreciate criminality of his conduct); Hobbs v. Heck, 919 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1990)
(text in WESTLAW) (denying appellant's claim that mental retardation equals insanity);
United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 950, 953 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding all mentally retarded
citizens to same standards as all other citizens), cert denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 116, 112 L.
Ed. 2d 86 (1990); Stripling v. State, 401 S.E.2d 500, 502-03 (Ga. 1991) (finding mildly retarded
defendant had mental capacity associated with murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault); State v. Holden, 365 S.E.2d 626, 630 (N.C. 1988) (finding mildly retarded defendant
culpable of murder); State v. Stokes, 352 S.E.2d 653, 657 (N.C. 1987) (finding mildly retarded
defendant able to control his behavior). See generally PAUL R. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF
MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 15-16 (ACLU Handbook 1976) (discussing misconception
public has toward mentally retarded); RITA WICKS-NELSON & ALLEN C. ISRAEL, BEHAVIOR
DISORDERS OF CHILDHOOD 218-19 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing mentally retarded person's ability to function in society).
94. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 n. 1 (1982) (noting explanation of American Psychiatric Association that mental retardation is learning disability and training impairment, rather than illness); McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(arguing limited mental capacity exempts no one from criminal responsibility unless mental
disability makes it impossible from knowing act was wrong); Lapia, 522 A.2d at 274 (finding
mildly retarded defendant able to recollect details and facts); Smith, 742 S.W.2d at 851 (finding mildly retarded defendant "knew what was going on" during his confession). In McDonald, the court argued that a person who deliberately chooses to perform a known criminal act,
though his or her mental capacity is impaired, should not be excused from criminal responsibility from that criminal act. McDonald, 312 F.2d at 859. Furthermore, the court argues that
if a defendant is able to understand the criminality of her actions, then she is sane in a legal
sense, even though she may have some mental disability. Id; see also RITA WICKS-NELSON &
ALLEN C. ISRAEL, BEHAVIOR DISORDERS OF CHILDHOOD 210 (2d ed. 1991) (exhibiting behavior that is less than civilized is not subhuman). See generally ROBERT M. ALLEN & ARNOLD D. CORTAZZO, PSYCHOSOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF
MENTAL RETARDATION 11 (1970) (discussing "aliene" attitudes of deficiency regarding mentally retarded persons). In the early twentieth century, misconceptions of mentally retarded
individuals resulted in a list of actual "multiple indictments" of retardation by the social
community:
(1) The mentally deficient are prolific.
(2) Their progeny, illegitimate as well as legitimate, are mentally deficient, neuropathic,
or dysgenic.
(3) This group has strong criminalistic propensities.
(4) They are a prime source of sex irregularities, promiscuity, prostitution, and
perversion.
(5) There is a close association between mental defectiveness and alcoholism with respect
to genesis and consequences.
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belief, combined with pity towards the mentally retarded, has isolated them
from the norm and denied them opportunities of a normal human existence. 95 Virtually all mentally retarded persons are capable of functioning on
their own in society and are required to conform their conduct within the
confines of law. 96 Mentally retarded persons enjoy the same rights under the
Constitution as do all citizens in the United States.97 Consequently, they

(6) Occupational incompetence,
among this group.

destitution, pauperism, and vagrancy are frequent

Id.
95. Cf KY CONST. § 145(3) (denying right to vote to "idiots" and insane persons); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-3-2(1) (Michie 1991) (denying anyone who not of sound mind opportunity to
marry); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30A-145 (Michie 1992) (providing for circuit clerk to submit
names of persons determined to be incompetent to State Board of Elections); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 41-45-1 (Supp. 1989) (providing involuntary sterilization of institutionalized women
afflicted with "idiocy" and "feeble-mindedness"); see THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
MENTAL RETARDATION,

THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW

219-20

(Michael Kindred et al. eds., 1976) (arguing label of mentally retarded denies opportunities to
participate in social activities); Elizabeth A. Steinbeck et al., Civil Penalties of the Mentally
Retarded: An Overview, 1 L. & PSYCHOL. 153, 154-56 (1975) (discussing social implications
resulting from being labelled mentally retarded).
96. See Woods, 923 F.2d at 1455 (finding mentally retarded murderer had mental capacity to appreciate criminality of his conduct and to conform his actions to requirements of law),
cert. denied sub nom. Singletary v. Woods, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 407, 116 L. Ed. 2d 355
(1991); Hobbs v. Heck, 919 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1990) (text in WESTLAW) (asserting mental
retardation, by itself, did not relieve defendant of criminal responsibility); Evans v. State, 467
S.W.2d 920, 922 (Mo. 1971) (holding mental retardation did not impair defendant from discerning right from wrong). The majority of mentally retarded defendants are able to form the
necessary intent to commit a criminal act. See SPENCER A. RATHUS & JEFFREY S. NEVID,
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 491 (1991) (contending that even moderately and severely handicapped individuals are capable of self-sustaining life outside of institutions); David A. Davis,
Executing the Mentally Retarded: The Status of FloridaLaw, 65 FLA. BAR J. 12, 13-16 (1991)
(arguing that mental retardation does not relieve defendant from criminal responsibility).
97. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988) (granting statutory right of
equal opportunity to handicapped persons); Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(c) (1988) (mandating provision of appropriate special-education services to handicapped children receiving free public education); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,12
(1967) (finding fundamental right to marry under Equal Protection Clause); Mills v. Board of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874-75 (D.D.C. 1972) (finding child has Fifth Amendment right to
education); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257,
1266 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (holding no child may be denied admission to public-school program,
nor his educational status changed, without opportunity of hearing); Boyd v. Board of Registrars of Voters, 334 N.E.2d 629, 630 (Mass. 1975) (striking down town's attempt to declare
mentally retarded persons ineligible to vote). See generally PAUL R. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS
OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 18-20 (ACLU Handbook 1976) (arguing mentally re-

tarded individuals are afforded right to education, to enter into a contract, to be married, to
obtain a driver's license, to vote, to be free from discrimination, and to obtain suitable employment and housing).
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should be subject to punishment when they invade or violate the rights of
other persons.
IV.

THE UNRELIABILITY OF

I.Q.

TESTS

Although the judiciary,9" state legislatures,9 9 and the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry" °° all accept the fact that the I.Q. should not be used
as a unitary measure of mental retardation, five states continue to use the
I.Q. in this manner, failing to recognize the fallibility of the I.Q. as a diag10 2
Tennessee," °3 Kentucky,104
nostic instrument. 10 1 Recently, Georgia,

98. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (recognizing wide range of behavior under classification of mentally retarded); Brown v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 948 F.2d 268, 269 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting need for other behavior to
be considered in addition to I.Q.); United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 724 n.16 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (noting I.Q. alone not determinative of mental retardation); Stripling v. State, 401 S.E.2d
500, 503 (Ga. 1991) (observing margin of error in I.Q. and other factors affecting I.Q.); Snow
v. State, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (describing I.Q. as crude barometer of
intelligence), appealgranted, 475 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (N.Y. 1984); Ex parte Williams, 833 S.W.2d
150, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (asserting many factors besides I.Q. to determine mental
retardation). See generally James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 421-22 (1985) (recognizing widespread acceptance
of this definition by courts).
99. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-551(26) (Supp. 1992); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1001.20(a) (Deering 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-Ig (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 5530 (Supp. 1992). See generally James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded CriminalDefendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 421-22 (1985) (recognizing widespread acceptance of this definition by legislatures).
100. E.g., AMA HANDBOOK ON MENTAL RETARDATION 20-33 (Herbert J. Grossman,
M.D. & George Tarjan, M.D. eds., 1987); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 28 (3d ed. 1980). The AMA places a
greater emphasis on behavior, social adaption, and developmental functioning in determining
whether an individual is mentally retarded, than does the AAMD. See AMA HANDBOOK ON
MENTAL RETARDATION 17 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. & George Tajan, M.D. eds., 1987)
(describing AMA definition). See generally James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally
Retarded CriminalDefendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 421 (1985) (recognizing widespread acceptance of this definition by professional organizations).
101. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie Supp. 1992) (stating that in capitalsentencing context "an intelligence quotient of seventy or below shall be presumptive evidence
of mental retardation"); Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339, 346 (Ga. 1989) (admitting all Georgia requires to relieve defendant from death penalty is I.Q. of 70 or lower). But see Snow, 469
N.Y.S.2d at 962 (disputing validity of I.Q. because it acts as "crude barometers" of intelligence); Levy v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., 399 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (rejecting I.Q. as only means of determining classification of mental retardation); but see also
Stripling, 401 S.E.2d at 503 (conceding I.Q. subject to wide margin of error). See AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 28-29 (3d ed. rev. 1987) (requiring adaptive behavior analysis in determination of mental
retardation); Mary D. Bicknell, Note, ConstitutionalLaw: The Eighth Amendment Does Not
Prohibitthe Execution ofMentally Retarded Convicts, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 357, 371 (1990) (sup-
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Maryland,10 5 and New Mexico" ° enacted statutes prohibiting the execution

of mentally retarded individuals who have an I.Q. below seventy. 17 Therefore, these states presume that no mentally retarded criminal defendant, regardless of the degree of retardation, could ever act with the degree of
blameworthiness associated with the death penalty. 18
Ironically, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Maryland all have statutes
adopting the three-part definition of mental retardation. 0 9 To reconcile
porting Georgia and Maryland's exoneration of mentally retarded from death penalty based on
I.Q. of 70 or below).
102. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992) (providing that defendant found guilty of crime but mentally retarded shall not be executed); see Fleming, 386 S.E.2d
at 346 (describing Georgia's statute of determining defendant's sentence based on expert testimony of defendant's I.Q.); Mary D. Bicknell, Note, ConstitutionalLaw: The Eighth Amendment Does Not Prohibit the Execution of Mentally Retarded Convicts, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 357,
371 (1990) (supporting state's setting I.Q. of 70 as dividing line between those who can be
executed and those who cannot).
103. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(3)(d) (1991) (providing that mentally retarded defendants shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without separate sentencing hearing).
104. Ky. REV. STAT. § 532.140 (Michie 1990) (providing that no severely mentally retarded offender shall be subject to death penalty).
105. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(0(1) (1992) (providing death may not be imposed on
mentally retarded defendants); see Mary D. Bicknell, Note, ConstitutionalLaw: The Eighth
Amendment Does Not Prohibit the Execution of Mentally Retarded Convicts, 43 OKLA.L. REV.
357, 371 (1990) (supporting Maryland's setting I.Q. of 70 as dividing line between those who
can be executed and those who cannot).
106. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2. I(A), (B) (Michie Supp. 1992) (providing penalty of
death shall not be imposed on any person who is mentally retarded, and I.Q. below 70 is
presumptive evidence of mental retardation).
107. Cf Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 514 (D.D.C. 1967) (arguing I.Q. tests
produce inaccurate and misleading test scores), a.ffd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobsen, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Levy, 399 A.2d at 162 (holding I.Q. scores as unreliable when not considered
with other factors). In Levy, the court held that the results of I.Q. tests, in and of themselves,
do not constitute substantial evidence of mental retardation. Id; see also Williams, 833 S.W.2d
at 151 (finding mental retardation cannot be determined solely from I.Q. tests). But see Mary
D. Bicknell, Note, ConstitutionalLaw: The Eighth Amendment Does Not Prohibit the Execution of Mentally Retarded Convicts, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 357, 371 (1990) (supporting Georgia
and Maryland statutes exonerating mentally retarded defendants from death penalty).
108. But see Hobbs v. Heck, 919 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1990) (text in WESTLAW) (finding
mentally retarded defendant can act with requisite degree of blameworthiness associated with
crime); Brogdon v. Butler, 824 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding mental retardation does
not necessarily constitute insanity or determine capability of distinguishing right and wrong),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1040 (1987); Stripling, 401 S.E.2d at 502-03 (finding mildly retarded
defendant had requisite degree of blameworthiness associated with murder, armed robbery,
and aggravated assault).
109. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(3) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992) (defining "mentally retarded" as "having significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning resulting in
or associated with impairments in adaptive behavior which manifested during the developmental period"); Ky. REV. STAT. § 532.130(2) (Michie 1990) (defining "seriously mentally retarded defendant" as person with "significant subaverage intellectual functioning existing
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these states' contradictory statutes, it appears that an individual is mentally
retarded when there is evidence of (1) subaverage general intellect, (2) deficits in adaptive behavior, and (3) onset during the early developmental period; except when the individual is a capital murderer, in which case his or
her I.Q. is the sole determinate of mental retardation.1 1 Thus, all that is
needed to exonerate a capital murderer from the death penalty is expert testimony that the defendant has obtained an I.Q. of seventy or less."1 ' Furconcurrently with substantial deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period"); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412 (1990) (defining "mentally retarded" as "a
developmental disability that is evidenced by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning
and impairment in the adaptive behavior of an individual"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A2. 1(A) (Michie 1991) (defining "mentally retarded" as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior"); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 33-1-101(15) (Michie 1984) (defining "mentally retarded individual or mentally deficient individual" as "an individual who has significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested during the
developmental period").
110. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(3) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992) (defining mentally retarded). The Georgia Code defines "mentally retarded" as "having significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning resulting in or associated with impairments in adaptive
behavior which manifested during the developmental period." Id. But see Fleming, 386 S.E.2d
at 346 (Smith, J., dissenting) (interpreting GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) as exempting defendant's with I.Q. of 70 or below from death penalty). All that is needed in Georgia to relieve
a defendant from the death penalty is expert testimony that the defendant has an I.Q. of seventy or lower. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie Supp. 1992) (providing that
penalty of death shall not be imposed on any person with intelligence quotient of 70 or below);
cf. Snow, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 962 (interpreting I.Q. scores as "crude barometers" of intelligence);
see also Mary D. Bicknell, Note, ConstitutionalLaw: The Eighth Amendment Does Not Prohibit the Execution of Mentally Retarded Convicts, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 357, 371 (1990) (supporting statutes that establish I.Q. of 70 as division between those who can be executed and
those who cannot).
111. See Fleming, 386 S.E.2d at 346 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing against exoneration
from death penalty based on I.Q. score). In Fleming, the court found the statute does not
require the defendant to be so severely or profoundly retarded as to be unable to understand
the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his conduct before exempting the defendant from
the death penalty. Id. at 345. Instead, the statute exonerates defendant based solely on defendant's I.Q. Id. at 346. Furthermore, the statute provides no guidance for the courts to give
proper weight to the defendant's adaptive behavior as required in the state's codified definition
of mental retardation. Id.; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(3) (Michie 1990 & Supp.
1992) (adopting three-part definition of mental retardation). All that is needed in Georgia to
relieve a defendant from the death penalty is that he or she have an I.Q. of seventy or lower.
See Fleming, 386 S.E.2d at 346 (interpreting Georgia statute); but see Snow, 469 N.Y.S.2d at
962 (interpreting I.Q. scores as "extremely crude barometers" of intelligence); Levy, 399 A.2d
at 162 (rejecting I.Q. scores as substantial evidence of mental retardation); Williams, 833
S.W.2d at 152 (finding mental retardation cannot be determined solely from I.Q. tests). See
generally JEROME M. SATrLER, ASSESSMENT OF CHILDREN 647 (2d ed. 1988) (finding that
only when individual falls into mentally retarded category with respect to both intellectual
functioning and adaptive behavior is diagnosis of mental retardation appropriate); Rick Heber,
Modifications in the Manual on Terminology and Classification in Mental Retardation, 65
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thermore, there is no requirement that the defendant's mental retardation
prevent him from appreciating the nature and quality, or the wrongfulness,
of his conduct12

Without the application of the three-part definition of mental retardation,
there is no investigation into the individual's adaptive behavior. Therefore,
there is no weight attached to the individual's ability to function and maintain himself or herself independently, to be engaged in gainful employment,
and to meet and conform to other personal and social responsibilities."'
Since an individual must demonstrate deficiencies in both adaptive behavior and measured intelligence in order to meet the criteria of mental retardation, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Maryland, and New Mexico have
eliminated, in the capital-sentencing context, the necessary and mandatory
criterion for a valid diagnosis of mental retardation." 4

AMER. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY

499-500 (1961) (requiring measure of individual's adaptive

behavior before considering him or her mentally retarded).
112. Fleming, 386 S.E.2d at 346 (noting fallibility of exoneration statute for failing to
allow for determination of defendant's ability to appreciate wrongfulness of his conduct). The
statute does not require the defendant to be so severely or profoundly retarded so as to be
unable to understand the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his conduct before exempting the defendant from the death penalty. Id. at 345. The Supreme Court has held that removing the "adaptive behavior" criterion from the definition of mental retardation invalidates
the entire determination process. See Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. at 443 n.9 (holding
mental retardation is not defined by I.Q. alone); Williams, 833 S.W.2d at 151 (finding mental
retardation cannot be determined solely from I.Q. tests); see also JANE R. MERCER, LABELING
THE MENTALLY RETARDED, CLINICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM PERSPECTIVES ON MENTAL

133 (1973) (requiring measure of individual's adaptive behavior before considering him or her mentally retarded); David A. Davis, Executing the Mentally Retarded: The
Status of Florida Law, 65 FLA. BAR J. 12, 13 (1991) (asserting I.Q. is not determinative of
mental retardation).
113. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 409 U.S. 302, 338-39 (1989) (refusing to consider I.Q. as
determinative of retardation because it underestimates life experiences and ability to use logic
in solving problems in day-to-day living); Levy, 399 A.2d at 162 (asserting I.Q. does not constitute substantial evidence of mental retardation). In Levy, the court asserted that without a
correlation between an individual's intelligence and ability to adapt to society, mental retardaRETARDATION

tion cannot be determined. Id.; see also AMA

HANDBOOK ON MENTAL RETARDATION

8

(Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. & George Tarjan, M.D. eds., 1987) (defining "impairments in
adaptive behavior"). The editors cite as the definition of an impairment in adaptive behavior, a
"significant limitation in an individual's ability to meet the standards of maturation, learning,
personal independence, and/or social responsibility expected of persons of the same age level
and cultural group, as determined by clinical assessment and (usually) standardized scales".
Id.
114. See Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. at 443 n.9 (1985) (noting that mental retardation is not defined by I.Q. alone); Levy, 399 A.2d at 162 (finding I.Q. scores by themselves
do not constitute substantial evidence of mental retardation); Williams, 833 S.W.2d at 152
(finding mental retardation cannot be determined solely from I.Q. tests). See generally JEROME M. SATTLER, ASSESSMENT OF CHILDREN'S INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL ABILITIES

647 (2d ed. 1988) (requiring both low I.Q. and inability to function properly in society for
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The use of the I.Q. as a unitary measurement of mental retardation by
Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, and Tennessee scorns the conclusions of experts in the fields of mental retardation for three basic reasons. First, a person's I.Q. score is not dispositive of mental retardation. Second, the score
does not remain constant. Third, a court's adoption of I.Q. scores as primafacie proof of mental retardation will potentially deprive all mentally retarded individual of certain rights and privileges.
A. An L Q. Is Not Dispositive of Mental Retardation Issue
Since each test incorporates a standard error of measurement, which demonstrates the existence of a variation between the obtained score and the true
score, 115 a score on an I.Q. test should not be dispositive of the issue of
mental retardation. 1 6 Furthermore, numerous studies show that intellimental retardation); Rick Heber, Modifications in the Manualon Terminology and Classification in Mental Retardation, 65 AMER. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 499, 499-500 (1961) (requiring

measure of individual's adaptive behavior before considering him or her as mentally retarded).
This manual for classifying the mentally retarded asserts that an individual must demonstrate
deficiencies in both adaptive behavior and "Measured Intelligence" in order to meet the criteria of mental retardation. Id. at 499. Furthermore, "Measured Intelligence" cannot be used as
the sole criterion of mental retardation because intelligence test performances do not always
correspond to level of deficiency in total adaptation. See id. at 500 (modifying levels of adaptive behavior to correspond with levels of Measured Intelligence).
115. See Stripling v. State, 401 S.E.2d 500, 503 (Ga. 1991) (conceding I.Q. scores are
subject to margin of error). The court noted that an I.Q. is not a truly accurate score; instead,
it is only accurate within a range of scores. Id. at 504.; Snow v. State, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (arguing against I.Q. scores as "crude barometers" of intelligence),
appealgranted,475 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (N.Y. 1984); see also ALAN AGRESTI & BARBARA FINLAY,
STATISTICAL METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 79 (2d ed. 1986) (defining standard error
as "a measure of the dispersion of the sampling distribution, and, thus, it can be used to describe how much variability there tends to be in the value of [the sample mean] from sample to
sample"); DAVID WECHSLER, MANUAL FOR THE WECHSLER INTELLIGENCE SCALE FOR
CHILDREN - REVISED 29 (1974) (noting I.Q. test's standard error of measurement). The manual asserts that "[t]he standard error of measurement ... is a function of the reliability coefficient" and provides the administrator of the test with confidence when making judgments
about an individual's true score on the test. Id.
116. Compare Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding claimant's
I.Q. of 69 inconsistent with mental retardation) with Popp v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1497, 14991500 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding claimant's claim of retardation based on I.Q. of 69 inconsistent
with evidence of two-year college associate degree). Cf Ellison v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 534, 536
(10th Cir. 1990) (finding claimant's I.Q. of 72 and social functioning did not satisfy disability
requirements of I.Q. of 60-69 and social limitations); Stripling, 401 S.E.2d at 504 (holding I.Q.
score of 70 or below is not conclusive of mental retardation). See generally ISSAM B. AMARY,
THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED - DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED TO TREATMENT AND EDUCATION 13 (1980) (arguing I.Q. scores alone should not be used to label per-

sons, but that consideration should be given to all known behaviors before finding that person
mentally retarded); RONALD W. CONLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 8-9
(1973) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of using I.Q. tests for determination of
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gence tests are imperfect measures of intelligence."1 ' Because of measurement error, these scores only represent approximations of a "true" score."'
Consequently, the obtained score is only one of a number of possible scores
that may be achieved with different sample questions or with the same questions at a different time." 9

mental retardation). But see Ludwik S. Szymanski, M.D., PsychiatricDiagnosis of Retarded
Persons, in EMOTIONAL DISORDERS OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 61, 61 (Ludwik S.
Szymanski, M.D. & Peter E. Tanguay, M.D. eds., 1980) (finding researchers who have relied
solely on I.Q. tests disregard degree of individual's adaption).
117. See Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 788 (5th Cir. 1991) (contrasting differing psychiatric evaluations of claimant's mental state); People v. Ward, 338 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ill. 1975)
(noting expert opinion that I.Q. varies depending on subjective determination of party administering test and atmosphere of testing conditions); Exparte Williams, 833 S.W.2d 150, 151
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (noting expert's testimony that individual's emotional state invalidated
his I.Q.). See generally AMA HANDBOOK ON MENTAL RETARDATION 67 (Herbert J. Gross-

man, M.D. & George Tarjan, M.D. eds., 1987) (noting limitations of I.Q. tests). The results of
an I.Q. test can be affected by choice of examiner or testing situation. Id. Variations are also
attributable to "differences in the standardization norms of different test instruments or to
changes between editions of the same scale" and can lead to misinterpretation. Id. "[T]ests
results are not equally applicable to all children; racial or cultural biases often are built into"
the tests. Id. "For these reasons the results of one I.Q. test do not constitute a diagnosis.
Scores are merely a record of one individual's performance on a given test." AMA HANDBOOK ON MENTAL RETARDATION 67 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. & George Tarjan, M.D.
eds., 1987); see also RONALD W. CONLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 8
(1973) (arguing that I.Q. tests fail to properly measure person's intelligence); PAUL R. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 25 (ACLU Handbook 1976) (arguing
that I.Q. tests are notoriously inaccurate because test is only one of many factors that are
required to make accurate diagnosis); Bruce Cushna, The PsychologicalDefinition of Mental
Retardation:A Historical Overview, in EMOTIONAL DISORDERS OF MENTALLY RETARDED
PERSONS, 31, 43 (Ludwick S. Syzmanski, M.D. & Peter E. Tanguay, M.D. eds., 1980).
118. Cf Stripling,401 S.E.2d at 503 (correlating defendant's I.Q. score with his adaptive
behavior led to conclusion that defendant had cheated on the intelligence test); Dickenson v.
Baltimore & Ohio Chic. Terminal, 220 N.E.2d 43, 50 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) (conceding that
appellee may have purposely given wrong answers to score low on I.Q. test); Snow, 469
N.Y.S.2d at 962 (interpreting I.Q. scores are ineffective measures of intelligence), appeal
granted, 475 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (N.Y. 1984); Williams, 833 S.W.2d at 151 (finding defendant's
emotional state invalidated I.Q. score); see also DAVID WECHSLER, MANUAL FOR THE
WECHSLER INTELLIGENCE SCALE FOR CHILDREN - REVISED 29 (1979) (defining "true score"
as "average score a child would obtain if he were tested a large number of times, and if the
effects of practice, fatigue, etc., could be ruled out").
119. See Lowery, 979 F.2d at 838 (finding inconsistent I.Q. testing scores); Markosyan v.
Sullivan, 933 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1991) (text in WESTLAW) (noting inconsistencies between
claimant's I.Q. scores on two different intelligence tests); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 925
(6th Cir. 1990) (stating that "[i]dentical I.Q. scores obtained from different intelligence tests do
not always reflect a similar degree of intellectual functioning"); Fairchild v. Lockhart, 900
F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding petitioner had "as many different intelligence scores as
there are tests that have been administered to him"); Ward, 338 N.E.2d at 174 (conceding that
I.Q. score varies depending on subjective determination of party administering test and atmosphere of testing conditions); Williams, 833 S.W.2d at 152 (finding defendant may score differ-
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Courts in the United States have consistently held that a low score on an
intelligence test does not provide a justifiable basis for classifying a child as
"mentally retarded."' 20 Intrinsic interest in the test's content, rapport with
the examiner, drive to excel on the test, and past habits of problem-solving
are all factors that distort the results of intelligence tests. 2 ' Moreover,

ently with change in emotional state). See generally AMA HANDBOOK ON MENTAL
RETARDATION 63-66 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. & George Tarjan, M.D. eds., 1987)
(describing numerous standardized tests available to determine mental retardation). The
handbook reveals a nonexhaustive list of such tests and includes the following: Denver
Prescreening Developmental Screening Test (PDQ), Denver Developmental Screening Test
(DDST), Gesell Developmental Schedules, Preschool Language Scale, Alpern-Boll Developmental Profile, Goodenough-Harris Drawing Test, Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale, Bayley
Scales of Infant Development, Cattell Infant Intelligence Scale, Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children-Revised (WISC-R), Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence (WPPSI).
Id.; see also RONALD W. CONLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 8 (1973)
(pointing out substantial errors of measurement in I.Q. tests due to physical conditions during
test, and attitudes and physical alertness of person taking test).
120. See Larry P. v. Riles, 502 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1974) (enjoining future placement
of children in schools for mentally retarded based on I.Q. tests); see also Serna v. Portales
Mun. Schs., 351 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (D. N.M. 1972) (finding I.Q. tests discriminatory against
Spanish surnamed children), affid, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401, 514 (D.D.C. 1967) (arguing that standardized aptitude tests produce inaccurate
and misleading scores), affd sub nor. Smuck v. Hobsen, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The
court held that standardized aptitude tests revealed misleading results when administered to
the lower class and African-American students. Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 514. Consequently,
these students are being incorrectly classified not by their ability to learn, but by their socioeconomic status or racial status. Id. The court contended that the intelligent tests results are
classifying students "according to environmental and psychological factors which have nothing to do with innate ability." Id. But see Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized
Ability Tests in Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691, 743-44 (1968) (advocating adaptive-behavior analysis because it provides objectivity in standardized testing to provide
check against personal prejudices of tests).
121. See Ward, 338 N.E.2d at 174 (noting expert statements conceding that I.Q. score
varies depending on subjective determination of party administering test and atmosphere of
testing conditions); Dickenson, 220 N.E.2d at 50 (recognizing uncertainty of I.Q. tests). In
Dickenson, the court noted that particular factors effect the resulting score of an I.Q., such as
accepted cultural biases, examinees' goal to perform poorly, or examiners ineffective testing
procedure. Dickenson, 220 N.E.2d at 50; see also Williams, 833 S.W.2d at 151-52 (finding
defendant's emotional state may have affected his I.Q. score and, thus, created a fact issue);
RITA WICKS-NELSON & ALLEN C. ISRAEL, BEHAVIOR DISORDERS OF CHILDHOOD 215 (2d

ed. 1991) (contending that caution must be observed when using I.Q. as label). The authors
discourage the use of I.Q. tests for identifying retardation and making decisions about education and placement. Id.; see also ALVIN ENIS HOUSE & MARJORIE L. LEWIS, Weschler Adult
Intelligence Scale - Revised, in MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 323,
365-69 (Charles S. Newmark ed., 1985) (discussing factors that effect individuals performance
on intelligence tests). The authors above indicate that excessive tension, anxiety, sensory limitations, motor limitation, and communication limitations all can affect an individual's I.Q.
score. Id. at 365-68. Another factor that adversely affects an I.Q. score is client faking. Id. at
368-69. Many individuals fake performance on I.Q. test so as to obtain disability benefits. Id.
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courts argue that evidence of a defendant's I.Q. results in the jury's focus of
attention on "a red herring that has absolutely no connection with the defendant's guilt or innocence."' 122 Thus, the use of an I.Q. score as the sole
means of determining whether the death penalty will be imposed may lead to
a misdiagnosis
of mental retardation, resulting in the admission of invalid
23
evidence. 1

B.

The Inconsistent I.Q. Score
Mentally retarded persons' I.Q. scores do not remain constant.'

24

Studies

at 369. When sophisticated and intelligent persons fake their I.Q. score, it is usually difficult to
notice the deception. ALVIN ENIS HoUST & MARJORIE L. LEWIS, Weschler Adult Intelligence
Scale - Revised, in MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 323, 369. Conse-

quently, the authors argue that in order to detect effectively deliberate underachievement, the
administrator of the test must compare the individual's I.Q. score with his or her adaptive
behavior. Id.; see also ALAN S. KAUFMAN, INTELLIGENT TESTING WITH THE WISC-R 13

(1979) (finding actual I.Q. score as gross underestimate of real intelligence).
122. Levy, 616 A.2d at 976 (discrediting I.Q. scores). The defense sought to introduce
evidence of the defendant's mental retardation to show that he lacked the intelligence necessary to conduct drug sales of such magnitude necessary to dispose of 65 grams of cocaine. Id.
The court argued that to allow evidence of his intelligence level would lead to the arguments of
an individual with a high I.Q. that "he was too smart to have engaged in the foolish and risky
business of selling drugs." Id. I.Q. scores underestimate person's life experiences as well as his
ability to use logic in solving everyday problems. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 338-39
(1989) (finding Penry's "mental age" as based on I.Q. scores imprecise); cf Snow, 469
N.Y.S.2d at 962 (arguing that I.Q. scores are inaccurate indicators of intelligence).
123. Cf Ward, 338 N.E.2d at 174 (conceding that I.Q. score varies depending on subjective determination of party administering test and atmosphere of testing conditions); Levy, 399
A.2d at 162 (holding I.Q. scores do not constitute substantial evidence of mental retardation);
Williams, 833 S.W.2d at 152 (finding mental retardation cannot be determined solely from I.Q.
tests); see Ren~e A. Forinash, Comment, Analyzing Scientific Evidence: From Validity to Reliability with a Two-Step Approach, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 223, 255-56 (1992) (discussing misinterpretation and abuse of scientific evidence and proposing two-part test). Under this test, the
court would first determine the validity of a person's I.Q. score and second, ascertain whether
the psychiatrist's conclusion is probable enough to be reliable, before allowing the admission of
defendant's I.Q. results. See id. at 255-56 (describing appropriate test to establish and admit
scientific evidence). The second part to this test would allow the judge to correlate the individual's I.Q. with the individual's adaptive behaviors. See id. (noting need to test scientific evidence before allowing wholesale admission into evidence). As a graphic example of the kind of
widespread unreliability existing in the use of the I.Q. to classify students, in a Boston study,
school systems labeled nearly 4,000 children as mentally retarded when the Department of
Mental Health there found only 1,500 of the children to be mentally retarded. Bruce Cushna,
The Psychological Definition of Mental Retardation:A HistoricalOverview, in EMOTIONAL DISORDERS OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 31, 42 (Ludwik S. Szymanski, M.D. & Peter E
Tanguay, M.D., eds., 1980). See generally RONALD W. CONLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF
MENTAL RETARDATION 9 (1973) (contending that best-known I.Q. tests misrepresent abilities
of nonwhites, the poor, and persons with physical and mental handicaps).
124. Cf Duhamel v. Collins, 955 F.2d 962, 966 n,3 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding defendant
scored 56 on I.Q. test administered prior to capital sentencing and 86 when he was 10 years
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show great fluctuation in I.Q. scores for reasons such as fatigue and illness. 125 Moreover, numerous studies demonstrate that a lack of motivation
1 26
can result in a low I.Q. score.
A 1981 study showed this high degree of fluctuation by administering an
I.Q. test to five individuals under normal testing conditions. 127 The resulting
scores of four of the individuals labeled each as "moderately" retarded, and
the fifth individual's score labeled him as "profoundly" retarded. 12 How-

ever, when these individuals were tested using a positive reinforcement, three
individuals were not labeled mentally retarded at all, and two individuals

old); Fairchild v. Lockhart, 900 F.2d 1292, 1298 n.5 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding petitioner had
scored I.Q. as high as 87 and as low as 60), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1052 (1990). But see Ramos
v. Ramos, 232 S.W.2d 188, 193 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950) (noting opinion by expert witness that
I.Q. scores remains constant until individual grows older); Rios v. State, 846 S.W.2d 310, 315
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (noting expert witness testimony that I.Q. tends to remain relatively
constant over time); DAVID WECHSLER, MANUAL FOR THE WECHSLER INTELLIGENCE
SCALE FOR CHILDREN - REVISED 31 (1974) (describing expected standard deviation in test
scores).

125. Cf Stripling v. State, 401 S.E.2d 500, 503 (Ga. 1991) (noting expert witness would
not administer I.Q. test to defendant because defendant was severely depressed); Snow v. State,
469 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (noting expert witness opinion that I.Q. scores
as "crude barometers" of intelligence), appeal granted, 475 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (N.Y. 1984); Ex
parte Williams, 833 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (describing expert's conclusion
that examinee's mild depression affected I.Q.); CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION
26-27 (Herbert J. Grossman, M.D. ed., 1983) (finding both fatigue and illness affect I.Q.
score).

126. See Gibson v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 882 F.2d 329, 330 (8th Cir.
1989) (finding lack of motivation during testing resulted in score 15 points lower than true
score); Boatwright v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 879 F.2d 862, 862 (5th Cir. 1989)
(invalidating claimant's I.Q. score for lack of motivation); cf Ambers v. Heckler, 736 F.2d
1467, 1468-69 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (invalidating claimant's I.Q. score for "faking" lower score to
obtain disability benefits); Stripling, 401 S.E.2d at 503 (invalidating defendant's I.Q. score for
cheating); see also Joy M. Clingman & Robert L. Flowler, The Effects of Primary Reward on
the I. Q. Performanceof Grade-SchoolChildrenas a Function ofInitialI.Q. Level, 9 J. APPLIED
BEHAv. ANALYSIS 19, 22 (1976) (finding reward increased I.Q. scores); Alan E. Kazdin, The
Effect of Vicarious Reinforcement on Attentive Behavior in the Classroom, 6 J. APPLIED
BEHAv. ANALYSIS 71, 74 (1973) (stating "motivative" reinforcement increased I.Q. scores);
Larry Maheady et al., A Comparison of Tangible Reinforcement and Feedback Effects on the
WPPSI I.Q. Scores of Nursery School Children, 6 EDUC. & TREATMENT OF CHILDREN 37, 43
(1978) (finding extrinsic rewards for correct responses significantly increase test performance);
Robin Miller Young, et al., Immediate and Delayed Reinforcement on WISC-R Performance
for Mentally Retarded Students, 3 APPLIED RES. IN MENTAL RETARDATION 13, 18-19 (1982)
(discussing reinforcement affecting I.Q. results).
127. See Stephen E. Breuning & Vicky J. Davis, Reinforcement Effects on the Intelligence
Test Performance of Institutionalized Retarded Adults: Behavioral Analysis, Directional Control, and Implications for Habilitation,2 APPLIED RES. IN MENTAL RETARDATION 307, 31820 (1981) (examining increases and decreases in I.Q. scores).

128. Id. at 320.
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were labeled as only "mildly" mentally retarded. 1 29 In other words, the results of the study indicated that the use of a reward to increase the individuals' desire to do well resulted in the escalation of their I.Q. scores by
approximately fifteen points. 130 Accordingly, lack of motivation and desire
can decrease an individual's I.Q. score, and when the end result of a test
score determines life or death, an individual may purposefully aim to achieve
a lower I.Q. score as a means of escaping the death penalty. 1 31
C.

An I.Q as Prima-FacieProofof Mental Retardation

The use of I.Q. tests as unitary measures of mental retardation in the determination of capital punishment will ultimately harm all mentally retarded
individuals. 32 In a Boston study, school systems had labeled nearly 4,000
children as mentally retarded based on individual I.Q. scores, whereas the

129. Id. The study indicated an increase of 20.3 points when a positive reinforcement
was administered. Id. at 311.
130. Id. The results of this study replicated "the results of precious studies showing that

the I.Q. of institutionalized mentally retarded individuals can be increased when reinforcement
is delivered contingent upon correct responding." Id. at 318; cf Stripling, 401 S.E.2d at 503
(invalidating defendant's I.Q. score because of his "faking" his intellectual ability).
131. See Duhamel, 955 F.2d at 966-67 (manipulating I.Q. score). In Duhamel, the court
found that the defendant had scored an 86 on an I.Q. test administered to him at the age of
ten. Id. at 966 n.3. However, when given an I.Q test prior to capital sentencing, the defendant
scored only a 56. Id. at 966; see also Markosyan v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1991)
(text in WESTLAW) (denying claimant's request for disability benefits based on claim of
mental retardation). In Markosyan, the court found that the claimant, who scored a 59 on an
I.Q. test, attempted to "convince the examiner of an innate lack of ability." Id. at *7;see also
Stripling, 401 S.E.2d at 503 (invalidating defendant's I.Q. score because of cheating).
132. Cf Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (arguing mental age to measure
capabilities of mentally retarded person could have disempowering effect in other areas of law).
The Court argued that "a mildly mentally retarded person could be denied the opportunity to
enter into contracts or to marry." Id.; cf Snow v. State, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983) (asserting I.Q. scores are inaccurate measurer of intelligence), appeal granted,475
N.Y.S.2d 1026 (N.Y. 1984); see THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITrEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION,
THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 218 (Michael Kindred et al. eds., 1976)
(discussing detrimental effect that labeling has on mentally retarded). The detrimental effect of
such labeling occurs because a child, who is excluded from school based on the label of mental
retardation, is "sentenced to a lifetime of illiteracy and public dependence," resulting from the
failure to learn the essential skills of society. Id. Furthermore, the classification of an individual as mentally retarded will tend to limit the individual's opportunities for employment to
"semiskilled, service, and unskilled" occupations. Id. at 220. The label of mentally retarded
may be good for severely or profoundly retarded persons; however, for the mildly retarded, the
label will be both a burden and a stigma, hindering them their entire life. See generally JANE
MERCER, LABELING THE MENTALLY RETARDED, CLINICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM PERSPECTIVES ON MENTAL RETARDATION 197 (1973) (arguing against "labeling" of mentally re-

tarded individuals); Elizabeth A. Steinbock et al., Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: An
Overview, 1 L. & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 151, 154 (1975) (discussing social implications of label
"mentally retarded").
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Department of Mental Health found only 1,500 of the children to be truly
mentally retarded. 133 A person labeled as mentally retarded may be relieved
of the death penalty, but the use of this type of labeling scheme in the legal
arena may lead to the deprivation of liberty and other rights and privileges
of the mentally retarded.1 34 For example, in most jurisdictions, involuntary
commitment of mentally retarded individuals into institutions is allowed
based on clear and convincing evidence.' 35 With the courts' adoption of the
I.Q. as the sole measure of mental retardation, a person's I.Q. score would be

133. See Bruce Cushna, The PsychologicalDefinition of Mental Retardation:A Historical

Overview, in EMOTIONAL

DISORDERS OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS

31, 42-43 (Ludwik

S. Szymanski, M.D. & Peter E. Tanguay, M.D. eds., 1980) (discussing misuse of I.Q. tests in
Boston study). The study dismissed the simplistic use of an I.Q. score to exclude children
based on their resulting classification of being mentally retarded. Id. at 43. During the 19691970 academic year, an estimated 7,000 and 15,000 children, respectively, were excluded from
school. Id. at 42.
134. The state legislatures' "bright-line" rule for mental retardation will create a legal
presumption of retardation for those individuals with I.Q. scores of seventy or below. See
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 1992) (finding I.Q. of 70 or below as presumptive
evidence of mental retardation). Consequently, in complying with this type of statute, courts
may potentially begin applying the "seventy or below" rule to other areas law. See, e.g, TEX.
CONST. art. 6, § I (disqualifying mentally disabled individuals from voting); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-49-302 (Michie 1991) (providing involuntary sterilization of institutionalized mentally
retarded individuals); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-2 (Michie 1991) (denying mentally retarded
individuals from marrying); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.075 (Michie 1993) (disqualifying
mentally disabled individuals from voting); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551-6 (West 1988)
(denying mentally retarded individuals from marrying); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-45-1 (Supp.
1989) (providing involuntary sterilization of institutionalized mentally retarded individuals).
See generally PAUL R. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 23-24
(ACLU Handbook 1976) (discussing negative consequences of being labeled "mentally re-

tarded" in legal context);

JANE R. MERCER, LABELING THE MENTALLY RETARDED,
CLINICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM PERSPECTIVES ON MENTAL RETARDATION 197 (1973) (argu-

ing that label of mentally retarded will be good for those who need to be nurtured and supervised, but for those who don't, label will be a burden and a stigma, depriving them of normal

education and plaguing them as they try to live normal lives); THE

PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW, 219-20

(Michael Kindred et al. eds., 1976) (arguing that label of mentally retarded will deny opportunities to participate in social activities).
135. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (establishing due process requirements for involuntarily commitment). Before being involuntarily committed, due process re-

quires the person (1) be mentally ill, and (2) dangerous to himself or others. Id. at 420-21. In
order to satisfy these requirements, evidence must establish "clearly, unequivocally and convincingly" that the individual requires commitment. See Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F.
Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (discussing burden of proof required for involuntarily commit-

ment); cf Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982) (requiring reasonable-doubt standard of proof to involuntarily commit mental retarded adults); Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274,
1282 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing precedent for proposition that establishing proper standard for
involuntary commitment requires balancing liberty of mentally retarded individual against de-

mands of organized society).
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considered clear and convincing evidence as to mental retardation, even
136
though the person may be perfectly capable of a self-sustaining life.
V.

CAPITAL SENTENCING OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED

The death penalty has been an acceptable mode of punishment in the
United States for as long as the nation has existed. 137 Indeed, the United
States Constitution specifically mentions capital punishment. 38 Accordingly, a state may take a person's life so long as it does not violate a defend139
ant's right to due process.

136. Cf Thornblad v. Olson, 952 F.2d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 1992) (recognizing clear and
convincing evidence standard for involuntary commitment); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393,
396 (10th Cir. 1968) (denying mentally retarded individual due process of law). In reaching its
decision in Heryford, the court stated the following:
[I]t matters not whether the proceeding be labeled civil or criminal or whether the subject
matter be mental instability or juvenile delinquency for it is the likelihood of involuntary
incarceration whether for punishment, rehabilitation, or treatment and training as a feeble-minded or mental incompetent, which commands observance of due process.
Id.; see Bruce Cushna, The PsychologicalDefinition of Mental Retardation:A HistoricalOverview, in EMOTIONAL DISORDERS OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 40-43 (Ludwik S. Szymanski, M.D. & Peter E. Tanguay, M.D. eds., 1980) (discussing misuse of I.Q. tests with
example of Boston study when schools labeled 4,000 children mentally retarded and state
agency found only 1,500 to be so labeled).
137. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-77 (asserting that the death penalty has
been widely accepted throughout common law of England and the United States). In Gregg,
the Court acknowledged that at the time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment, every
state had the death penalty. Id. at 177. Additionally, the First Congress of the United States
enacted the death penalty as punishment for certain crime. Id. Since the First Congress's
adoption of the death penalty, American courts have repeatedly found the imposition of the
death penalty constitutional. E.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331 (1976); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 285 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976); see Juliet L. Ream, Comment, Capital Punishmentfor Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is It Morally and Constitutionally Impermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L.
REV. 89, 95-96 (1990) (discussing history of capital punishment in United States).
138. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a Capital, or otherwise infamous crime"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating "[n]o state shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law").
139. See Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 15-16 (1978) (recognizing that due process
requires notice to defendant of specific aggravating factors State intends to rely on during
sentencing); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (recognizing that due process requires highly particularized individual sentencing); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175 (recognizing that due process prohibits
disproportionate sentencing); see Lisa Gayle Bradley, Proportionalityin Capital and Non-Capital Sentencing: An Eighth Amendment Enigma, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 195, 195-96 (1986) (asserting that Eighth Amendment permits capital sentencing only when done with regularity and
reliability); Randy Hertz & Robert Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v.
Ohio and the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL.
L. REV. 317, 322 (1981) (arguing Constitution requires individualized capital-sentencing).
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The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

In the modem era, debate on the death penalty has centered largely
around the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause."4 The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, originating from
the English Bill of Rights, 1 41 was adopted by the United States to protect
individuals from barbarous and torturous punishments. 42 The United
States Supreme Court began to outline standards under which this clause
would be interpreted in Weems v. United States,'4 3 asserting that a punish140. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (deciding whether it is
cruel and unusual to execute juveniles); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (deciding
whether it is cruel and unusual to execute mentally retarded persons); Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (deciding whether it is cruel and unusual to execute insane person); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (deciding whether it is cruel and unusual to
execute a rapist); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1878) (finding death by public
shooting not cruel and unusual punishment); see Miriam Berkman, Perspectives on the Death
Penalty: Judicial Behavior and the Eighth Amendment, 1 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 41, 44
(1982) (discussing historical interpretation of Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause);
Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and UnusualPunishments Inflicted:" The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969) (tracing roots of Eighth Amendment to colonial
Virginia).
141. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 243 (1972) (citing English Bill of Rights).
"The English Bill of Rights, enacted December 16, 1689, stated that 'excessive bail ought not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, not cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.' " Id.;
see also Ford, 477 U.S. at 406 (arguing that Framers of Eighth Amendment intended to provide same protection as guaranteed in English Bill of Rights); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100
(1958) (noting origin of phrase "cruel and unusual"); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890)
(noting that Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause taken from act of 1688 English Parliament); Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135-36 (1879) (discussing Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
in accordance with early legislation); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 843 (1969) (comparing English
version of Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause with intent of American draftsmen); Eric L.
Shwartz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: "Idiocy" and the Framers' Intent Doctrine, 16 NEw
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 315, 336 (1990) (noting that Framers of Constitution
borrowed Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause from English Bill of Rights of 1689).
142. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 260-64 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing meaning of
phrase "cruel and unusual"); Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288, 1290 (6th Cir. 1975) (recognizing Eighth Amendment's prohibition of inhuman, barbarous, or torturous punishments);
Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 860-61 (1969) (discussing early construction of phrase "cruel and
unusual" in United States); see also Anthony A. Avey, Note, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 539, 541-44
(1993) (debating precise meaning of Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause); Maria A. Luise,
Note, Solitary Confinement: Legal and Psychological Considerations, 15 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 301, 305-06 (1989) (maintaining that purpose of English Bill of
Rights was prohibition of prevalent forms of barbarous and torturous punishments).
143. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In Weems, the Court confronted the issue of determining the
constitutionality of a Philippine law which provided as punishment for the crime of falsifying
an official document, "twelve years and one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist .... hard and
painful labor, . . . no marital authority or parental rights or rights of property .. " Id. at 366.
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ment is cruel and unusual if it is excessive in relation to the offense committed'" or if it is an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. 145 The Court,
in later cases, contended that the clause must be interpreted in a flexible
manner so as to conform with the "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society." ' 46 In these later cases, the Court argued

The Court found the punishment to be cruel and unusual based on the lack of proportionality
between the crime and the offense. See id. at 380-82 (discussing historical basis for finding lack
of proportionality); see Lisa Gayle Bradley, Proportionalityin Capital and Non-Capital Sentencing: An Eighth Amendment Enigma, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 195, 197-200 (1986) (discussing
Court's movement in Weems towards view that punishments must be proportionate to crime);
Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay Wishingrad, Comment, The Eight Amendment, Beccaria, and the
Enlightenment: An HistoricalJustificationfor the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 783, 790 (1975) (discussing Framers' intent to prohibit only
those punishments that were "barbarous" and "torturous").
144. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 380 (noting great disparity in crime committed and its punishment); see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (holding that criminal sentence
must be directly related to personal culpability); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting importance of culpability concept in sentencing decisions);
cf Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (finding punishment that fails to further
penological justifications of retribution or deterrence amounts to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (recognizing Court precedent
prohibiting punishments that involve "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"); see also
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (defining excessive punishment as one that makes
no measurable contribution to any acceptable goal of criminal punishment); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (recognizing public's perceptions of standards of decency requires
punishment not be excessive). To say that a punishment must not be excessive means that the
punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and must not be
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. Id. See generally Lisa Gayle Bradley,
Proportionalityin Capital and Non-Capital Sentencing. An Eighth Amendment Enigma, 23
IDAHO L. REV. 195, 196-99 (1986) (discussing proportionality requirement of Eighth
Amendment).
145. Weems, 217 U.S. at 381; see also Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (finding punishment excessive when it involves unnecessary infliction of pain). In Coker, the Court determined whether
it was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to sentence a defendant to
death for rape. Id. at 593. In its analysis, the Court asserted that the sentence of death was
grossly disproportionate and excessive for the crime of rape. Id. at 592. However, despite the
Court's finding that making some crimes subject to the death penalty does violate the Eighth
Amendment, American courts have continued to find the various methods of execution within
the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 444-45 (upholding constitutionality
of execution by electrocution); O'Bryan v. McKaskle, 729 F.2d 991, 993-94 (5th Cir. 1984)
(upholding execution by lethal injection by drugs not approved by Federal Drug Administration); Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1061 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding execution by cyanide gas
poisoning), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983). See generally Lisa Gayle Bradley, Proportionality in Capitaland Non-CapitalSentencing: An Eighth Amendment Enigma, 23 IDAHO L. REV.
195, 196-99 (1986) (discussing historical underpinnings of proportionality requirement of
Eighth Amendment); Dora Nevares-Muniz, The Eighth Amendment Revisited. A Model of
Weighted Punishments,75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 272, 273-78 (1984) (discussing evolution of punishments prohibited by Eighth Amendment).
146. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (observing dynamic nature of Eighth Amendment
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that the best representation of the "evolving standards of decency" is how
the country's legislatures view a particular punishment.' 47
B.

Sentencing Guidelines

In 1972, it appeared that society's evolving standards of decency had begun to change when the Court, in Furman v. Georgia,148 found unconstitutional the capital-sentencing statutes before it. 149 However, to ensure
greater reliability in the imposition of the death penalty,' 50 instead of focus-

which "draw[s] its meaning" from evolving standards of decency); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 36970 (stating proper framework for Eighth Amendment analysis as assessing evolving standards
of decency); Penry, 492 U.S. at 330-31 (tracing development of society's perspective on punishing "idiots" and "lunatics" to determine evolving standards of decency); Ford, 477 U.S. at 40608 (interpreting common law of England and America prohibiting the execution of insane
persons); see also Miriam Berkman, Perspectives on the Death Penalty: Judicial Behavior and
the Eighth Amendment, 1 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 41, 48-50 (1982) (discussing constitutional
analysis of "evolving standards of decency"); William A. McDaniel, Jr., Note, Gardner v.
Florida: The Application of Due Process To Sentencing Procedures, 63 VA. L. REV. 1281, 1287
(1990) (discussing importance of constitutional safeguards in imposing death penalty due its
finality).
147. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 (arguing that clearest and most reliable source to discern
"evolving standards of decency" is legislation); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823-29
(1988) (identifying most reliable objective sign of "evolving standards of decency" is legislation
that society has enacted). In order to challenge effectively a punishment as cruel and unusual,
the Supreme Court has required the demonstration of a national consensus against such punishment. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373 (holding legislative judgments and jury sentencing as
most reliable source of society's evolving standards of decency towards certain punishments).
The Court in Stanford explained that "a revised national consensus so broad, so clear, and so
enduring as to justify a permanent prohibition upon all units of democratic government must
appear in the operative acts that the people have approved." Id. at 377. See generally John J.
Gruttadaurio, Editorial Note, Consistency in the Application of the Death Penalty to Juveniles
and the Mentally Impaired: A Suggested Legislative Approach, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 211, 222
(1989) (discussing Court's long-standing tendency to defer capital-sentencing questions to
legislatures).
148. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
149. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. The Court held that the application of capital sentencing, without judicial guidance, represented an unconstitutional infringement of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id.; see William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the
Death Penalty: A View from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 314 (1986) (noting that before
Furman was decided, no American court had ever struck down any death-penalty statute); see
also Richard E. Wirick, Comment, Dark Years on Death Row: Guiding Sentencer Discretion
After Zant, Barclay, and Harris 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 689, 689-90 (1984) (discussing significant effects of Furman on state capital-punishment statutes).
150. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1988) (citing Lockett for proposition
that greater degree of reliability required when death penalty imposed due to qualitative difference between death and other punishments); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468-69 (1984)
(contending that irrevocability of death penalty requires heightened procedural safeguards);
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (recognizing call for greater degree of reliability for sentence of death,
because of penalty's qualitative difference). See generally Miriam Berkman, Perspectives on the
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ing on the "evolving standards of decency," the Court focused on the procedures whereby defendants were selected for the death penalty.' 51 The
Court's purpose in Furman was two-fold: first, to hold that a sentencing
procedure that did not include both aggravating and mitigating factors could
be considered cruel and unusual punishment; 152 and second, to guarantee
that a sentencing procedure will not be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.' 5 3 After Furman, thirty-seven states enacted new death-penDeath Penalty: JudicialBehavior and the Eighth Amendment, 1 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 41, 42
(1982) (discussing constitutional analysis of examining regularity aspect of inflicted punishment); Robert Woll, Note, The Death Penalty and Federalism: Eighth Amendment Constraints
on the Allocation of State Decision making Power, 35 STAN. L. REV. 787, 818 (1983) (discussing Eighth Amendment's procedural safeguards to justify death sentence).
151. The application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause was an extremely on-

erous task as evidenced by the fact that all nine Justices wrote separate opinions. See Furman,
408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (finding sentencing procedures "wantonly" and
"freakishly" imposed); see also id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that sentencing procedures provided no exactness from when death penalty was imposed and when it is not); see
also id. at 279-280 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that death penalty served no greater
penal purpose than did less severe punishment); see also id. at 257-58 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(acknowledging authority finding capital-sentencing procedures unconstitutional); cf Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 598 (1986) (finding the change in discretionary sentencing after
Furman). See generally Daniel Ross Harris, Note, Capital Sentencing After Walton v. Arizona: A Retreat From the "Death Is Different" Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1389, 1389-90,
1394-98 (1991) (discussing Eighth Amendment's development and refinement after Furman
decision); Richard E. Wirick, Comment, Dark Years on Death Row: Guiding Sentencer Discretion After Zant, Barclay, and Harris, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 689, 689-90 (1984) (discussing
significant impact Furman had on state capital-sentencing statutes).
152. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 255-56 (finding capital-sentencing statutes unconstitutional
when not discretionary); see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248- 49 (1976) (asserting that
sentencer was required to weigh eight specified aggravating factors against seven specified mitigating factors). In Proffitt, the Court reasoned that this requirement forced the sentencer to
"focus on the circumstances of the crime and the character of the individual defendant." Id. at
251. Consequently, the Florida statute endeavors to assure "that the death penalty will not be
imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner." Id. at 253. In addition to aggravating circumstances, a capital-sentencing statute must allow the sentencer to consider mitigating circumstances. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976) (requiring that state's capital-sentencing
statutes allow sentencer to consider mitigating circumstances); see also Lockett, 438 U.S. at
608 (finding Ohio capital-sentencing statute unconstitutional because it listed three specific
mitigating circumstances). The Court reasoned that the Constitution requires individualized
consideration of mitigating factors. Id. at 606. See generally RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 140 (1982) (discussing elimination of
arbitrary imposition of death penalty); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1942-44 (1988) (discussing discretionary guidelines in capital-sentencing context).
153. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that valid capitalsentencing statute must impose death penalty with respect for human dignity); see also id. at
309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that imposition of death penalty in arbitrary fashion
is unconstitutional). See generally Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the Eighth Amendment. Furman and Gregg in Retrospect, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
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14
alty statutes in accordance with the Court's guidelines.'

In 1976, the Court, in Gregg v. Georgia,' 5' had its first opportunity to
review the states' newly enacted capital-sentencing statutes. 156 In upholding

Georgia's death-penalty statute, 15 7 the Gregg Court explicitly held that the

imposition of the death penalty does not necessarily amount to cruel and
unusual punishment and is, therefore, constitutional. 5 ' Thus, the capitalsentencing statutes of Florida, Georgia, and Texas were constitutional be927, 932 (1985) (discussing Justice Brennan's analysis in Furman that Eighth Amendment
prohibits inflicting severe punishment); Richard E. Wirick, Comment, Dark Years on Death
Row: Guiding Sentencer Discretion After Zant, Barclay, and Harris, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
689, 693 (1984) (recognizing impact of Furman on development of mitigating factors).
154. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West 1992); see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325, 328-29 (1976) (holding that mandatory death penalty for first-degree murder unconstitutional); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976) (making death penalty
mandatory for persons convicted of first-degree murder, although subsequently declared unconstitutional); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (discussing enactment of numerous post-Furman statutes). See generally Daniel Ross Harris, Note, Capital Sentencing
After Walton v. Arizona: A Retreat from the "Death Is Different" Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L.
REV. 1389, 1396-1405 (1991) (discussing newly enacted death-penalty statutes after the
Furman decision); Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1690, 1699-1712 (1974) (discussing death-penalty statutes enacted
immediately after Furman).
155. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
156. The Court then applied its holding in Gregg to companion cases. See Roberts, 428
U.S. at 333 (invalidating mandatory capital-sentencing provision that narrowed definition of
first-degree murder); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302 (noting, among deficiencies in statute, failure to
guide jury's discretion); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 (upholding Texas sentencing statute for safeguards narrowing definition of capital murder); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 253 (approving Florida's
capital-sentencing statute because of specific guidance given judge and jury providing consistency of judgments); see also Jane C. England, Capital Punishment in the Light of Constitutional Evolution: An Analysis ofDistinctionsBetween Furman and Gregg, 52 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 596, 602-07 (1977) (discussing distinctions between Furman and Gregg); Linda K.
Richey, Comment, Death Penalty Statutes: A Post-Gregg v. Georgia Survey and Discussion of
Eighth Amendment Safeguards, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 497, 497-99 (1977) (discussing distinctions
between Furman and Gregg).
157. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 154. The Georgia capital-sentencing statute was found constitutional because it provided additional safeguards, such as a mandatory appellate review, that
further protected against the capricious imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 204.
158. See id. at 169 (contending death penalty does not invariably violate Constitution).
The Court applied a two-part test to measure what is "cruel and unusual." First, the punishment would be considered cruel and unusual if it was a barbarous or torturous penalty outlawed in the eighteenth century. Id. at 170-71. Second, the punishment is considered cruel
and unusual if it violates the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 173; see also Tropp v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (arguing that
Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society"); Jane C. England, Note, Capital Punishment in the Light of
ConstitutionalEvolution: An Analysis of DistinctionsBetween Furman and Gregg, 52 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 596, 596 (1977) (finding death penalty not unconstitutional per se).
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cause the statutes ensured that the death penalty would not be imposed in an
arbitrary or capricious manner.15 9 Consequently, these three states' statutes
became models for other states to enact constitutional capital-sentencing
statutes. l6
To provide for the individualized consideration required for imposing the
1 61
death penalty, each of these statutes provides for a bifurcated proceeding.
159. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 (holding Texas capital sentencing scheme constitutional
because it guided jury's discretion by "narrowing the class of death eligible crimes and by
requiring the jury to answer additional special issues regarding deliberateness, future dangerousness and provocation"); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252-53 (finding Florida capital-sentencing statute to be constitutional because it required trial judges to consider both aggravating and
mitigating circumstances during sentencing phase of trial); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 154 (concluding
that Georgia capital-sentencing statute was not in violation of Eighth Amendment). But see
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989) (finding Texas sentencing scheme unconstitutional
because it did not allow jury to express its reasoned, moral response to Penry's evidence of
mental retardation). Current versions of the Florida, Georgia, and Texas capital sentencing
statutes are as follows: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1992), GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-10-30 (Michie Supp. 1992), TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
See also Maria M. Homan, Note, The Juvenile Death Penalty: Counsel's Role in the Development of a Mitigating Defense, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 784-86 (1987) (discussing Georgia,
Florida, and Texas capital-sentencing statutes after Furman); Linda K. Richey, Comment,
Death Penalty Statutes: A Post-Gregg v. Georgia Survey and Discussion of Eighth Amendment
Safeguards, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 497, 497-98 91977) (discussing Georgia's capital-sentencing
statute); Eric L. Shwartz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: "Idiocy" and the Framers' Intent
Doctrine, 16 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 315, 321-24 (1990) (discussing
Texas capital-sentencing statute).
160. The Florida, Georgia, and Texas capital-sentencing statutes have four common elements. See Linda E. Carter, A Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard in Death Penalty Proceedings: A Neglected Element of Fairness, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 197 (1991) (describing
capital-sentencing statutes from Georgia, Texas, and Florida as foundation for current deathpenalty statutes). The author gleans four basic requirements from the three death-penalty
statues: first, a bifurcated proceeding determining guilt or innocence separately from penalty;
second, a statute defining narrowly the class of persons who are subject to the death penalty;
third, admission of all relevant mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase; fourth, a
meaningful appellate review. Id.; see also Maria M. Homan, Note, The Juvenile Death Penalty.
Counsel's Role in the Development of a MitigatingDefense, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 786 (1987)
(arguing that Georgia, Florida, and Texas cases mandated "consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death").
161. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-91 (asserting bifurcated systems are more likely to protect against arbitrary and capricious imposition of death penalty). In Gregg, the Court did not
mandate that all capital-sentencing statutes must have bifurcated proceedings to be constitutional. Id. Instead, the Court recognized that capital-sentencing statutes should have bifurcated proceedings so as to allow sentencer the ability to consider all evidence relevant of the
sentence of death. Id.; see Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269 (discussing Texas capital-sentencing bifurcated proceeding and mandatory appellate review); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248 (discussing Florida's provision for bifurcated proceeding). After Gregg, states throughout the country have
enacted bifurcated proceedings into their capital-punishment statutes. See Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 456 n.8 (1983) (listing all codified bifurcated proceedings); see also
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The first phase of the proceeding determines the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. 62 If the defendant is found guilty of a capital offense, the sentencer,' 63 in a separate sentencing proceeding, then determines whether the
death penalty should be imposed. " In order to impose the death penalty,
the sentencer is required to find at least one aggravating circumstance' 65

Stanton D. Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt's End: Death-QualificationReexamined, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3-4 n.14 (1987) (discussing practice of bifurcated proceedings);
Robert L. Spangenberg & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Capital Punishment or Life Imprisonment?
Some Cost Considerations, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 45, 52 (1989) (asserting virtually all states

with death penalty employ bifurcated proceedings).
162. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-92 (separating guilt-innocence phase from sentencing phase).
The Court reasoned that "much of the information that is relevant to the sentencing decision
may have no relevance to the question of guilt, or may even be extremely prejudicial to a fair
determination of that question." Id. at 190. Furthermore, the bifurcated proceedings guarantee that procedural rules do not bar the admission of relevant mitigating evidence during the
sentencing phase. Id.; see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 457 (1981) (noting that bifurcated
proceedings include separate guilt and penalty phases); see also Jonathan R. Sorensen & James
W. Marquart, Prosecutorialand Jury Decision-Making In Post-Furman Texas Capital Cases,
18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 743, 747- 49 (1991) (discussing Texas bifurcation proceeding to determine guilt and punishment). See generally F. Patrick Hubbard, "ReasonableLevels
ofArbitrariness"in Death Sentencing Patterns: A Tragic Perspective on Capital Punishment, 18
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1113, 1116-18 (1985) (discussing constitutional models of capital-sentencing schemes in United States).
163. A judge or jury can act as the sentencer during the penalty phase. See Clemons v.
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1990) (finding no constitutional right to have jury impose
death sentence); cf Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (holding judge may override jury's sentencing recommendation); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 389 (1985) (finding constitutional judge's power to override jury's sentencing recommendation); Spaziano, 468
U.S. at 460 (holding neither Sixth nor Eighth Amendment provide defendant with right to jury
during sentencing).
164. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-92 (separating guilt-innocence phase from sentencing phase).
The Court reasoned that this provides the sentencer with information relevant to the imposition of sentence. Id. at 195; see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 n.37 (1987) (contending that separate sentencing phase is required to ensure necessary degree of care in imposing
death penalty); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 432 (1981) (discussing Missouri's bifurcated proceeding); see also F. Patrick Hubbard, "Reasonable Levels of Arbitrariness" in Death
Sentencing Patterns: A Tragic Perspective on Capital Punishment, 18 U.C. DAVIs L. REV.
1113, 1116-17 (1985) (discussing four-stage "winnowing" process identifying persons to be
executed); Jonathan R. Sorensen & James W. Marquart, Prosecutorialand Jury Decision-Making In Post-Furman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 743, 747-49
(1991) (arguing that in Texas, capital sentencing leaning is almost mandatory).
165. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990) (explaining role of aggravated
circumstances in capital-sentencing scheme); Clemons, 494 U.S. at 751 (remanding because
uncertain appellate court reviewed sufficiently aggravating circumstances when affirming death
penalty); McKoy, 494 U.S. at 443-44 (vacating death sentence because state statute unconstitutionally limited jury's consideration of mitigating factors in conjunction with aggravating factors); Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 639 (finding aggravating factor to be sentencing factor allowing
judge to impose death penalty); Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 244-45 (acknowledging that finding
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during the sentencing phase. 66 The defendant is then given the opportunity
to introduce any relevant mitigating factors.' 67 Accordingly, the defendant
may introduce any aspect of his character, background, or circumstance of
the offense, that may lead to a sentence less than death."' 8 By allowing the

aggravating factors is constitutional means of channelling jury's discretion in imposing death
penalty).
166. See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1990) (finding the presence of
aggravating circumstances serves purpose of limiting number of death-eligible defendants);
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983) (finding that aggravating circumstances of crime
distinguishes gravity of offense so as to narrow class of death-eligible defendants); Gregg, 428
U.S. at 196-98 (describing how statutes requiring finding of aggravating circumstances provide
for controlled discretion in imposition of death penalty). States are required to define aggravating circumstances so as to distinguish the people most deserving of the death penalty. See
id. (describing kinds of specific circumstances of individual defendant's crime that single out
defendant for death penalty); cf Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 246 (finding death sentence that duplicates aggravating circumstances with underlying elements of offense not unconstitutional).
The Court in Lowenfield held that as long as aggravating circumstances narrow the class of
death penalty-eligible defendants at the guilt phase, then all that is constitutionally required at
the sentencing phase is the introduction of mitigating factors. Id.; see also Maria M. Homan,
Note, The Juvenile Death Penalty: Counsel's Role in the Development of a Mitigation Defense,
53 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 784-86 (1987) (discussing aggravating factors in constitutionally valid
capital-sentencing statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas). See generally Bruce S. Ledewitz,
The New Role of Statutory Aggravating Circumstances in American Death Penalty Law, 22
DUQ. L. REV. 317, 351 (1984) (discussing purpose of aggravating factors in bifurcated
proceedings).
167. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 327-28 (stating that sentencer must be able to consider and
give effect to all mitigating evidence presented by defendant during sentencing); Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (holding that state cannot withhold defendant's mitigating evidence of pretrial good behavior); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-15 (finding unconstitutional
withholding evidence of defendant's emotional disturbance and troubled-family background);
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 606-07 (finding Ohio capital-sentencing statute unconstitutional because it
limited its mitigating factors to three specific circumstances); cf Coleman v. Saffle, 912 F.2d
1217, 1221 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding convicted first-degree murderer's I.Q. relevant and admissible as mitigating evidence at penalty stage), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1053 (1990). See generally
Jonathan R. Sorensen & James W. Marquart, Prosecutorialand Jury Decision-MakingIn PostFurman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 743, 748-50 (1991) (discussing purpose of mitigating factors in bifurcation proceedings); Eric L. Shwartz, Comment,
Penry v. Linaugh: "Idiocy" and the Framers' Intent Doctrine, 16 NEw. ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 315, 321-24 (1990) (discussing Texas capital-sentencing statute's inclusion of mitigating circumstances).
168. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 663 (stating Constitution prohibits states from barring from
sentencing proceedings "any aspect of a defendant's character or record, or any circumstance
surrounding the crime"); Penry, 492 U.S. at 319 (holding any relevant evidence of defendant's
character and background must be given effect in sentencing defendant); Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987) (holding advisory jury improperly instructed to consider only
statutory mitigating factors); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (requiring jury to give effect to any
mitigating evidence relevant to defendant's background, character, or circumstances of crime).
But see Lockett, 438 U.S. 586, 631 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part) (arguing that to encourage jury to consider "anything under the sun" as mitigating cir-
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introduction of mitigating factors and allowing the sentencer to give effect to
these mitigating factors in any manner it pleases, the sentencing phase provides the sentencer with a vehicle for conveying its "reasoned moral response" to the mitigating factors in rendering its decision.' 69 Consequently,
the sentencer has the controlled discretion to impose the death penalty on
those persons for whom the death sentence is appropriate. 7 °
C.

Mental Retardation as a Mitigating Factor
Unlike a defendant who is insane, a defendant who is mentally retarded is

not automatically excused from the crime. 7 ' Instead, one's mental retarda-

cumstance will not "guide sentencing discretion but will totally unleash it"); cf Bell v.
Lynaugh, 858 F.2d 978, 985 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding defendant does not have constitutional
right to jury instruction regarding mental retardation as mitigating circumstance), cert. denied,
492 U.S. 925 (1989); see also Stanton D. Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt's End:
Death-Qualification Reexamined, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3-4 n. 14 (1987) (discussing adoption of bifurcated proceedings as opposed to single-verdict procedure); Eric L. Shwartz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: "Idiocy" and the Framers'Intent Doctrine, 16 NEW. ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 315, 321-24 (1990) (discussing mitigating evidence and Texas's

three special issues).
169. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 327-28 (stating any sentencing statute must allow jury vehicle
for expressing its "reasoned moral response"). In Penry, the Court held that the Texas deathpenalty statute unconstitutionally restricted the jury's consideration of the defendant's mental
retardation as mitigating evidence. Id.; see also McKoy, 494 U.S. at 443 (holding that sentencer must give effect to mitigating evidence in whatever manner it pleases); Franklin v.
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 184 (1988) (O'Connor, J. concurring) (stating any sentencing body
must consider all mitigating evidence); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) (stating
sentencer must consider all mitigating evidence); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116-17 (overturning
capital sentence because sentencer refused to consider certain mitigating evidence); see also
Bruce S. Ledewitz, The New Role of StatutoryAggravating Circumstancesin American Death
Penalty Law, 22 DUQ. L. REV. 317, 351-52 (1984) (discussing purpose of mitigating circumstances in bifurcated proceedings); Juliet L. Ream, Comment, Capital Punishmentfor Mentally
Retarded Offenders: Is It Morally and ConstitutionallyImpermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L. REV. 89,
109 (discussing mental retardation as mitigating factor).
170. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (asserting state's right to provide
for death penalty so long as law is not arbitrary or capricious). In Godfrey, the Court relied on
that precedent to argue that every capital-sentencing statute must provide "clear and objective" standards, "specific and detailed" guidance, and an opportunity for rational review of the
process in imposing the death penalty. See id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198); see also Zant,
462 U.S. at 877 (declaring that state must channel sentencer's discretion in order to adequately
narrow number of persons eligible for death penalty); Rupert v. Barry, Note, Furman to
Gregg: The Judicialand Legislative History, 22 How. L.J. 53, 86-87 (1979) (finding capitalsentencing statutes after Furman limited sentencer's discretion).
171. See Hall v. Florida, 1993 WL 5050, *4 (Fla.) (holding that mental retardation does
not provide for pretense of moral or legal justification); Hobbs v. Heck, 919 F.2d 738 (6th Cir.
1990) (text in WESTLAW) (finding that appellant's claim that mentally retarded is equivalent
to being insane "lacked an arguable basis in law"); Brogdon v. Butler, 824 F.2d 338, 341 (5th
Cir. 1987) (holding mental retardation does not constitute insanity or incapacity to know difference between right or wrong), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1040 (1987); see also Stripling v. State,
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tion is introduced as mitigating evidence to attempt to show that there is less
culpability than with other capital criminals and that the defendant is, thus,
deserving of a sentence less than death. 7 2
The Supreme Court first addressed mental retardation in the context of
capital punishment in the 1978 case of Lockett v. Ohio,73 in which the Court
determined that retardation may be a significant mitigating factor at sentencing, especially when the defendant lacks specific intent to commit a capital
offense.' 7 4 Following Lockett, numerous state legislatures concluded that
mental retardation is an appropriate mitigating factor and, thus, amended
their statutes to allow as a mitigating circumstance the impairment of one's
capacity to appreciate the criminality of one's conduct as a result of mental
401 S.E.2d 500, 502-03 (Ga. 1991) (finding mildly retarded defendant had mental capacity
associated with murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault); Evans v. State, 467 S.W.2d
920, 922 (Mo. 1971) (asserting that although I.Q. tests indicate mental retardation, defendant's
impairment was not so substantial as to prevent him from distinguishing right from wrong).
See generally James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded CriminalDefendants,
53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 432-44 (1985) (discussing mentally retarded defendants nonresponsibility argument); Juliet L. Ream, Comment, Capital Punishmentfor Mentally Retarded
Offenders: Is It Morally and Constitutionally Impermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L. REV. 89, 92-94
(1990) (discussing courts differentiating mentally retarded from insane).
172. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 436 (1990) (finding defendant's capacity "to appreciate criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to requirements of law"
mitigating circumstance); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (finding that defendant's disadvantaged background, and emotional or mental problems may make her less culpable than defendants who have no such excuses); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 164 (1988)
(permitting good prison disciplinary record as mitigating evidence); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481
U.S. 393, 397-99 (1987) (finding petitioner's habit of inhaling gasoline fumes as mitigating
circumstance); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 640 (1978) (finding defendant's background, intelligence, prior offenses, character, and habits as mitigating circumstances); Cuevas v. Collins,
932 F.2d 1078, 1081-82 (5th Cir. 1991) (approving trial court's rejecting defendant's I.Q. of 70
as sole mitigating evidence); see also Donald H.J. Hermann et al., Sentencing of the Mentally
Retarded CriminalDefendant, 41 ARK. L. REV. 765, 803-04 (1988) (discussing effect of mental
retardation on culpability); Juliet L. Ream, Comment, Capital Punishmentfor Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is It Morally and ConstitutionallyImpermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L. REV. 89,
138 (1990) (finding mental retardation could result in lack of moral culpability).
173. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
174. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608 (holding that sentencer in capital cases must be able to
consider any independent, relevant mitigating factors for sentencing phase to be constitutional). The Court asserted that the sentences must consider as mitigating factors the defendant's lack of specific intent and minor role in the offense. Id. at 597; see Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (holding that state courts must consider all relevant mitigating evidence); cf Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding ineffective assistance
of counsel when attorney failed to present mitigating evidence of defendant's mental retardation and lack of intent); see also Joe P. Tupin & Harold A. Goolishian, Mental Retardationand
Legal Responsibility, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 673, 675 (1969) (discussing mentally retarded person's ability to discern wrong from right); Juliet L. Ream, Comment, Capital Punishmentfor
Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is It Morally and ConstitutionallyImpermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L.
REV. 89, 92-93 (1990) (discussing mental retardation as mitigating factor).
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5

Penry v. Lynaugh

In Penry v. Lynaugh, 176 the Court, for the first time, addressed the issue of
whether a mentally retarded person convicted of capital murder could be
sentenced to death. 177 The Court, finding only one state that explicitly
banned the execution of the mentally retarded, concluded that there was
insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded individuals to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment. ' Acknowledging that it may be cruel and unusual to
175. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(6) (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(E)(2)
(1989); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103(l)(b), (4) (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-46a(g) (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West 1985); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(f) (1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.032(3) (Vernon Supp. 1992); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(4) (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(a) (Supp. 1992); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(C) (Michie Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(6) (1988);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B)(iv) (Michie 1990); WYo. STAT. § 6-2-102(j)(vi) (1988 &
Supp. 1992).

176. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). In this case, Penry, a twenty-two year-old mentally retarded
male, was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 307. On October 25,
1979, Penry entered the home of Pamela Carpenter, where he raped, beat, and stabbed her
with a pair of scissors. Id. Despite finding evidence of Penry's mental retardation, namely, an
I.Q. of approximately sixty-three, the jury found him guilty of capital murder. Id.
177. Id. at 334-35. In a separate opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Kennedy, and Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part, the Justices rejected the
claim that a "mildly" mentally retarded defendant lacked the necessary culpability to justify
the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 351; see Juliet L. Ream, Comment, CapitalPunishment for Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is It Morally and ConstitutionallyImpermissible?, 19
Sw. U. L. REV. 89, 93-94 (1990) (discussing imposition of death on mentally retarded).
178. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (not finding similar national consensus as found with
prohibition of executing insane individuals); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 & n.2
(1985) (finding no states permit execution of insane defendants). The Court in Fordnoted that
of the forty-one states that have a death penalty or statutes governing execution procedures,
twenty-six states have statutes explicitly requiring the suspension of the execution of a prisoner
who meets the legal definition for incompetence. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 n.2. From this statistic, the Court concluded that the "ancient and humane limitation upon the State's ability to
execute its sentences has a firm hold upon the jurisprudence of today." Id. at 409; cf.Williams
v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448, 451 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding imposition of death penalty on mildly
mentally retarded defendant did not violate Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113
S. Ct. 510, 121 L. Ed. 2d 445 (1992); Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472, 1481-82 (4th Cir.
1991) (holding defendant with mild mental retardation cannot be categorically excluded from
death penalty). The Court has clearly stated that a national consensus is best represented
through legislation. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-73 (1989) (concluding
that number of states permitting execution of 16-year-old defendants does not sufficiently
demonstrate national consensus against such punishment); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 154
(1987) (finding several states permitting execution of felony murderers regardless of intent
"powerfully suggests" national consensus in favor of such punishment); Ford, 477 U.S. at 408
(finding no state authorizes execution of insane defendants); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
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execute a profoundly retarded defendant,1 79 the Court opined that the sentence of death was constitutional because the jury found Penry competent to
stand trial and able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. 8 o Today,
four years since the rendering of the Penry decision, only five states have
8

categorically exempted the mentally retarded from the death penalty.' '
Therefore, the number of states continuing to permit the execution of mentally retarded capital offenders strongly indicates that society continues to
" 2
condone the execution of mentally retarded capital murderers.
In contrast, when the Court found a national consensus against executing
the insane, no state permitted the execution of an insane person, and twentysix states had statutes explicitly requiring suspension of the execution of a
capital defendant who became insane.' 83 In regard to the mentally retarded,

594 (1977) (finding no state authorizes death penalty for rape). See generally Rebecca DickHurwitz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: The Supreme Court Deals a FatalBlow to Mentally
Retarded Capital Defendants, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 699, 711-714 (1990) (arguing Court is
flawed in its national consensus analysis); Eric L. Shwartz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: "Idiocy" and the Framers' Intent Doctrine, 16 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
315, 326 (1990) (discussing national consensus analysis in Penry).
179. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 (determining evolving standards of decency required
Court to look to objective evidence of how society views particular punishments); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-96 (1982) (comparing state legislation addressing death penalty to
determine "evolving standards of decency"); Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-97 (discussing "evolving
standards of decency" in context of determining proportionate penalty for crime of rape); see
also V. Stephen Cohen, Comment, Exempting the Mentally Retardedfrom the Death Penalty:
A Comment on Florida'sProposed Legislation, 19 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 457, 467-68 (1991)
(describing Supreme Court's finding no cruel and unusual punishment in executing mildly
retarded criminal defendant); Juliet L. Ream, Comment, CapitalPunishmentfor Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is It Morally and Constitutionally Impermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L. REV. 89,
109 (1990) (noting lenient attitudes towards "profoundly" retarded defendants).
180. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 333 (finding defendant competent to stand trial); White v.
Estelle, 669 F.2d 972, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding mentally retarded defendant able to
appreciate wrongfulness of criminal conduct), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1118 (1983); Stripling v.
State, 401 S.E.2d 500, 503 (Ga. 1991) (finding mildly retarded defendant had capacity to distinguish between right and wrong); see also Patricia Hagenah, Note, Imposing the Death Sentence on Mentally Retarded Defendants: The Case of Penry v. Lynaugh, 59 UMKC L. REV.
135, 139-42 (discussing Penry's holding that it is not cruel and unusual to impose the death
penalty on mentally retarded individuals); Juliet L. Ream, Comment, Capital Punishmentfor
Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is It Morally and ConstitutionallyImpermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L.
REV. 89, 92 (1990) (noting Court's finding that Penry was competent to stand trial).
181. Eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT.
Ann. § 532.140 (Michie 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412 (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3120A-2.1 (Michie 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1990).
182. Cf Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (finding that only one state explicitly prohibits execution
of mentally retarded defendants, and this does not indicate sufficient national consensus to
exempt categorically all mentally retarded defendants).
183. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (finding no states allow execution of insane defendant);
People v. Burson, 143 N.E.2d 239, 244 (Ill. 1957) (asserting that "trial, adjudication, sentence
or execution" of insane individuals violates due process).
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twenty-eight states continue to permit the execution of mentally retarded
defendants."' s Consequently, five states prohibiting the execution of the
mentally retarded is insufficient evidence to conclude that a national consensus exists to support the exculpation of mentally retarded persons from the
85
death penalty.'
Critics of the Penry decision argue that public opinion polls evidence a
national consensus against the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded.18 6 Emphasizing public opinion polls as wholly unpersuasive, 1" 7 the Court reasoned that surveys fall short of establishing a national

184. Cf Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (holding that two states prohibiting execution of mentally
retarded persons and 14 states prohibiting death penalty does not constitute of national consensus against such punishment for mentally retarded capital offenders). Since Penry, only
four states have exonerated the mentally retarded from the death penalty. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992) (providing that death penalty shall not be
imposed on a mentally retarded defendant); KY. REV. STAT. Ann. § 532.140 (Michie 1990)
(providing that no severely mentally retarded offender shall be subject to death penalty); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412 (1989) (providing that penalty for defendants who are mentally
retarded may not be death); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1992)
(providing that penalty of death shall not be imposed on any person who is mentally retarded);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1990) (providing that mentally retarded defendant shall not
be sentenced to death).
185. A careful inquiry into the Supreme Court's national consensus analysis seems to
indicate that a national consensus against the imposition of the death penalty on mentally
retarded capital murderers still does not exist. Cf Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71 (finding national consensus against imposition of death penalty on criminal offenders below age of 16);
Penry, 492 U.S. at 333-34 (finding insufficient evidence of national consensus against execution
of mentally retarded defendants convicted of capital offenses to establish categorical exemption). In Stanford, the Court found fifteen states prohibited execution of sixteen-year-old offenders and twelve states prohibited execution of seventeen-year-old offenders. Id. at 370; see
also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823-29 (1988) (examining state legislation authorizing capital punishment and relationship between age of defendant and unusual punishment);
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 154 (1987) (finding wave of state legislation authorizing imposition of death penalty for felony murder "powerfully suggests" society's condoning this punishment); Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (finding "no state in the union" allows execution of insane
persons); Coker, 433 U.S. at 594-96 (finding national consensus against imposition of death
penalty for rape of adult women). In Coker, the Court found that only one state authorized a
sentence of death for rape. Id.
186. See John Blume & David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally Retarded to Death: An
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REV. 725, 759-60 (1988) (citing public opinion
surveys finding 71% of Floridians oppose death penalty for mentally retarded capital murderers). The authors note a Georgia State University poll, which found that Georgia residents
categorically reject the death penalty for mentally retarded capital murderers. Id. The authors also found that a South Carolina poll resulted in finding 56% of those surveyed believed
that mentally retarded murderers should not be executed. Id. See generally Patricia Hagenah,
Note, Imposing the Death Sentence on Mentally Retarded Defendants: The Case of Penry v.
Lynaugh, 59 UMKC L. REV. 135, 141-42 (1990) (discussing role of public-opinion polls in
national consensus analysis on execution of mentally retarded).
187. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 335 (finding public-opinion polls not indicative of national
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consensus because of inherent methodological flaws and the lack of a standard definition of mental retardation.1 8 The Court opined that no one has a
"better sense of the evolution in the views of the American people than do
their elected representatives." 18 9 Accordingly, the Court continues to rely
on legislative enactments in its interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 190
VI.

SUGGESTED GUIDELINES IN THE CAPITAL SENTENCING OF THE
MENTALLY RETARDED

Mental retardation alone does not mean that an individual lacks the cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability

consensus); see also Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377 (finding public-opinion polls not determinative of
national consensus). In Stanford, the Court stated its reliance on national consensus by saying,
"a revised national consensus so broad, so clear and so unenduring as to justify a permanent
prohibition upon all units of democratic government must appear in the operative acts laws
and the application of laws that the people have approved." Id. The Court interpreted "operative facts" as being the laws and the application of laws of the state legislatures. Id.; see also
Licia A. Esposito, Note, The Constitutionality of Executing Juvenile and Mentally Retarded
Offenders: A PrecedentialAnalysis and Proposalfor Reconsideration, 31 B.C. L. REV. 901,
910-12 (1990) (discussing Court's means of determining evolving standards of decency); Tanya
M. Perfecky, Note, Children, the Death Penalty and the Eighth Amendment: An Analysis of
Stanford v. Kentucky, 35 VILL. L. REV. 641, 657 (1990) (discussing use of "evolving standards
of decency" rationale as indicative of national consensus).
188. Cf Penry, 492 U.S. at 335 (arguing that public sentiment expressed in public-opinion polls, if true, will ultimately find its way into legislation); Weight Watchers Int'l v. Stouffer
Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (giving no weight to defendant's survey because survey contained serious "methodological flaws").
189. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-35 (noting number of states adopting such statutes). In
Penry, the Court opined that "[t]he public sentiment expressed in... polls... may ultimately
find expression in legislation, which is an objective indicator of contemporary values upon
which we can rely." Id. at 335; see also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 858-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(leaving questions of "evolving standards of decency" to elected representatives). See generally
John J. Gruttadaurio, Editorial Note, Consistency in the Application of the Death Penalty to
Juveniles and the Mentally Impaired: A Suggested Legislative Approach, 58 U. CIN. L. REV.
211, 222 (1989) (discussing Court's long-standing tendency to defer capital-sentencing questions to state legislatures).
190. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 (discussing deference given to state legislatures);
Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 (noting Court's reliance on state legislatures as evidence of contemporary values); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) (noting importance of states' legislatures in determining public's attitude); cf Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174-75 (1976)
(finding that legislative enactments weigh heavy in analysis, but are not dispositive of society's
standards because courts must still analyze constitutionality). See generally John J. Gruttadaurio, Editorial Comment, Consistency in the Application of the Death Penalty to Juveniles
and the Mentally Impaired: A Suggested Legislative Approach, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 211, 222
(1989) (discussing Court's preference for letting individual states decide protection for defendants under sentencing statutes).
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associated with the death penalty. 19 ' However, those mentally retarded individuals who are so profoundly retarded that they lack the necessary capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their criminal conduct deserve
exoneration from the death penalty.' 9 2 This exoneration should not be determined based on a fallacious I.Q. score. Instead, state legislatures and
courts should adhere to the following guidelines when a capital defendant is
mentally retarded.
First, the mentally retarded defendant must be found mentally culpable at
the time the offense was committed. 93 For instance, if the mentally re-

191. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 338 (1989) (recognizing diverse capabilities of
mentally retarded person requires individualized consideration and not exoneration of all responsibility); Mathenia v. Delo, 975 F.2d 444, 453 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming lower court's
finding defendant's mental retardation did not preclude him from having necessary level of
culpability needed for imposing death penalty), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3652 (U.S. Mar. 29,
1993) (No. 92-7457); Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454, 1455 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding individual with I.Q. of 69 had mental capacity to appreciate criminality of his conduct), cert. denied
sub nom. Singletary v. Woods, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 407, 116 L. Ed. 2d 355 (1991); Hobbs v.
Heck, 919 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1990) (text on WESTLAW) (finding appellant's claim that mentally retarded is equivalent to being insane "lacked an arguable basis in law"); Brogdon v.
Butler, 824 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding mental retardation does not constitute
insanity nor incapacity to know difference between right or wrong), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1040
(1987); Stripling v. State, 401 S.E.2d 500, 503 (Ga. 1991) (finding mildly retarded defendant
had capacity to distinguish between right and wrong); Evans v. State, 467 S.W.2d 920, 922
(Mo. 1971) (accepting that although I.Q. tests indicate mental retardation, defendant's impairment was not sufficient to prevent him from distinguishing right from wrong); State v. Stokes,
352 S.E.2d 653, 657 (N.C. 1987) (finding mildly retarded defendant able to control his behavior). See generally David A. Davis, Executing the Mentally Retarded: The Status of Florida
Law, 65 FLA. BAR J. 12, 13 (1991) (stating that mentally retarded individuals are not completely exempt from criminal responsibility because they can formulate necessary intent). But
see V. Stephen Cohen, Comment, Exempting the Mentally Retardedfrom the Death Penalty:
A Comment on Florida'sProposed Legislation, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 457, 467-68 (1991)
(describing Court's statement that it is cruel and unusual to execute profoundly or severely
retarded defendant).
192. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 330-31 (finding that it may be cruel and unusual to execute
profoundly retarded defendants according to "evolving standards of decency"); cf. Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-96 (1982) (discussing Court's analysis of society's acceptance of
death penalty in certain circumstances); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-97 (1977) (stating
Court's reliance on history and legislative enactments to determine standards of decency). See
generally V. Stephen Cohen, Comment, Exempting the Mentally Retardedfrom the Death Penalty: A Comment on Florida'sProposedLegislation, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 457, 467-68 (1991)
(noting Court's observation that it would be cruel and unusual to execute profoundly or severely retarded defendant); Juliet L. Ream, Comment, Capital Punishmentfor Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is It Morally and Constitutionally Impermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L. REV. 89,
109 (1990) (noting lenient attitude towards profoundly retarded defendants).
193. Watkins v. State, 620 P.2d 792, 794 (Idaho 1980); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 998
(Mont. 1984); see Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (holding that
defendants who suffer from defective mental condition at time of criminal act must be found
not guilty).
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tarded defendant was so severely retarded as not to know that the criminal
conduct was wrong, or to be incapable of conforming his or her conduct to
the requirements of the law, then the defendant should not be executed.' 9 4
Second, the mentally retarded defendant must be found competent to stand
trial.1 95 In other words, the defendant must have the ability to consult with
a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and the defend96
1
ant must have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings.'
194. See United States v. Velasco, 471 F.2d 112, 114-15 (7th Cir. 1972) (recognizing possibility of acquittal when defendant is "incapable of conforming her conduct to the law").
Courts have consistently held that a defendant who is incapable, as a result of mental disease
or defect, to conform his conduct to the requirements of law deserves exoneration from criminal responsibility. See, e.g., United States v. Holt, 450 F.2d 868, 869 (5th Cir. 1971) (acknowledging exoneration of criminal responsibility for defendant who was "incapable of conforming
his conduct to law"); United States v. Smith, 437 F.2d 538, 539 (6th Cir. 1970) (finding defendant's claim that his mental retardation made him "incapable of conforming his conduct to
law" sufficient to establish mental incompetency); United States v. Barfield, 405 F.2d 1209,
1209 (6th Cir. 1969) (asserting that defendant is not responsible for his crime if his mental
defect rendered him substantially "incapable of conforming his conduct with requirements of
law"); see Sherri Ann Carver, Note, Retribution - A Justificationfor the Execution of Mentally Retardedand Juvenile Murderers, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 155, 178 (1991) (discussing
Penry's claim that his mental retardation made him "incapable of conforming his conduct to
the law"); Laura E. Reece, Comment, Mothers Who Kill: Postpartum Disordersand Criminal
Infanticide, 38 UCLA L. REV. 699, 743-44 (1991) (discussing exoneration from criminal responsibility for being "incapable of conforming her conduct to the requirements of law" due to
emotional illness).
195. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (reversing lower
court and creating test for competency to stand trial). In Dusky, the Court declared that a
defendant is competent to stand trial if he has the "ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding" and has a "rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Id. Courts have continued to follow the Dusky test in
deciding whether a defendant is competent to stand trial. See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 333
(finding defendant competent to stand trial according to test set out in Dusky); White v. Estelle, 459 U.S. 1118, 1119 (1983) (describing lower court's empaneling jury for competency
hearing in which expert testimony showed "borderline mental retardation"); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (recognizing long-standing acceptance that defendant lacking
capacity to understand proceedings against him should not be subject to trial); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 388 (1966) (stating Dusky test for competence to stand trial as ability of
defendant to "consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him"); see
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 290 (ABA Criminal Justice Standards
Committee Projects ed., 1989) (asserting that mentally retarded defendant is incompetent to be
executed when he or she cannot understand impending proceedings); Sandra Anderson Garcia
& Holly Villareal Steele, Mentally Retarded Offenders in the Criminal Justice and Mental Retardation Services Systems in Florida: Philosophical, Placement, and Treatment Issues, 41
ARK. L. REV. 809, 826 (1988) (discussing Dusky test for competency to stand trial); Juliet L.
Ream, Comment, Capital Punishment for Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is It Morally and
ConstitutionallyImpermissible?, 19 S.w. U. L. REV. 89, 113 (1990) (discussing Dusky test for
competency to stand trial and its ineffectiveness for mentally retarded individuals).
196. White, 459 U.S. at 1119-20; see People v. Burson, 143 N.E.2d 239, 244-45 (Ill. 1957)
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Third, before a mentally retarded defendant can be convicted, the trier-offact must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of the crime alleged, including culpable mental state. 97 Thus, a profoundly mentally retarded defendant can show that the severity of retardation raises a
reasonable doubt concerning the mens rea required for the crime.' 98 For
example, a mentally retarded individual charged with a capital murder can
introduce evidence of mental retardation to attempt to raise a reasonable
doubt concerning intent. Consequently, when the capital murderer is severely or profoundly retarded, the state will have an onerous task to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's ability to form the necessary intent associated with the death penalty.' 9 9 Fourth, before a mentally re-

(stating requisite understanding for establishing competency). In Burson, the court opined
that the defendant must be capable of understanding the "nature and object of the proceedings
against him, his own condition in reference to such proceedings, and have sufficient mind to
conduct his defense in rational and reasonable manner." Id.; see also Benjamin James Bernia,
Note, The Burden of Proving Competence To Stand Trial: Due Process at the Limits of Adversarial Justice, 45 VAND. L. REV. 199, 203 (1992) (discussing test for competency to stand
trial); Ann L. Hester, Note, State v. Gravette: Is There Justicefor Incompetent Defendants in
North Carolina?,69 N.C. L. REV. 1484, 1489-90 (1991) (discussing United States Supreme
Court's rule of competency to stand trial).
197. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In Winship, the Court rejected the trial
court's "preponderance of the evidence" standard and required the defendant's guilt be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The state's failure to prove every element of the defendant's
crime results in an acquittal. Id. at 363.
198. Since a defendant's mental state is an element of capital murder, the state is required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the requisite mental state
associated with the crime. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975) (holding
defendant is not required to prove facts that negate elements of crime); cf Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790, 798-99 (1952) (stating it is appropriate to place burden on defendant to prove
insanity). Therefore, a mentally retarded defendant is not required to prove his mental retardation, but instead the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the intent. Cf Cooper v.
North Carolina, 702 F.2d 481, 484-85 (4th Cir. 1983) (asserting that state must prove defendant's intent beyond reasonable doubt because mental illness negates element of intent); Stacy v.
Love, 679 F.2d 1209, 1213 (6th Cir. 1982) (requiring state to prove defendant's sanity beyond
a reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1009 (1982); Barber v. State, 757 S.W.2d 359, 363
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (holding it is permissible to place burden on defendant or proving
incompetency to stand trial), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1091 (1989); Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 830-31 (1977) (discussing "strict" mens rea approach as admitting
evidence showing defendant did not have requisite level of mens rea for charged offense).
199. Cf Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 (1982) (finding profoundly retarded
person could not talk or care for himself); but cf Mathenia v. Delo, 975 F.2d 444, 453 (8th
Cir. 1992) (finding harmless error defendant's failure to assert in state court that mild mental
retardation precluded him from having level of culpability needed to impose death penalty),
cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3652 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1993) (No. 92-7457); see Donald H.J. Hermann
et al., Sentencing of the Mentally Retarded CriminalDefendant, 41 ARK. L. REV. 765, 803-04
(1988) (discussing effect mental retardation has on culpability); Juliet L. Ream, Comment,
Capital Punishmentfor Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is It Morally and Constitutionally Im-
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tarded defendant can be sentenced to death, the sentencer must find, beyond
a reasonable doubt, one statutorily defined aggravating circumstance,200
while the defendant may introduce any relevant mitigating circumstance,
such as the severity of mental retardation, that may justify a sentence less
than death.2"' Subsequently, the sentencer must weigh the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors before sentencing the defendant to

permissible?, 19 Sw. U. L. REV. 89, 138 (1990) (finding mental retardation could result in lack
of moral culpability).
200. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (requiring at least one aggravating
circumstance before sentence of death can be imposed). In Jurek, the Texas capital-sentencing
statute was found constitutional because it properly narrowed the class of defendants eligible
for the death penalty. Id. Subsequently, states throughout the country modeled the Texas
capital-sentencing statute, requiring the sentencer find at least one aggravating circumstance
before the death penalty can be imposed. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 751
(1990) (requiring one valid aggravating circumstance before imposing death penalty); McKoy
v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 458 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (requiring at least one
aggravating circumstance before imposing death penalty); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638,
639 (1989) (imposing death penalty requires finding at least one aggravating circumstance);
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 242 (1988) (requiring jury to find beyond reasonable doubt
at least one aggravating circumstance before imposing capital punishment); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 67 n. 1 (1987) (requiring sentencing authority to find at least one aggravating
circumstance before imposing death penalty); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 302 (1987)
(requiring jury to find at least one aggravating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt before
imposing death penalty); Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 154 (1986) (asserting that death can
not be imposed unless there is evidence of aggravating circumstance); Caldwell v. Mississippi,
472 U.S. 320, 344 (1985) (instructing jury that they must find at least one aggravating circumstance before imposing death penalty); Coker, 433 U.S. at 587 n.3 (asserting that jury must find
at least one aggravating circumstance before imposing death penalty); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 161 (1976) (instructing jury that they must find at least one aggravating circumstance before imposing death penalty); see also Maria M. Homan, Note, The Juvenile Death
Penalty: Counsel's Role in the Development of a Mitigation Defense, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 767,
785-87 (1987) (discussing aggravating factors in capital-sentencing statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas). See generally Bruce S. Ledewitz, The New Role of Statutory Aggravating
Circumstances in American Death Penalty Law, 22 DuQ. L. REV. 317, 351 (1984) (discussing
purpose of aggravating factors in bifurcated proceedings).
201. See Hitchock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987) (holding that defendant must
be able to present mitigating evidence to jury); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976) (holding that jury must be able to give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to
defendant's background, her character, or circumstances of crime); Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684
F.2d 794, 802 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding sentencing statutes not clearly guiding jury in understanding purpose of mitigating factors violates Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); see also
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 290 (ABA Criminal Justice Standards
Committee Project ed., 1989) (asserting that mentally retarded defendant is incompetent to be
executed when he or she cannot convey pertinent information to counsel or judge); see also
Stanton D. Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt's End: Death-Qualification Reexamined, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 n.14 (1986) (discussing bifurcation proceedings); Eric L.
Shwartz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: "Idiocy" and the Framers' Intent Doctrine, 16 NEW.
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 315, 321-24 (1990) (discussing role and purpose of
mitigating evidence).
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death.2 °2 Fifth, the defendant must understand the impending fate of the
execution.2 "3 In other words, the mentally retarded defendant must be
aware of the impending execution and the reason for its imposition. 2° All
of these safeguards must be overcome before the state can subject a mentally
retarded defendant to the death penalty.
Ultimately, these guidelines will ensure that all mentally retarded capital
defendants receive the required individualized consideration that the Constitution guarantees. If state legislatures opt for the alternative chosen by the
legislatures of Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Maryland, and New Mexico,

202. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 662-63 (1990) (finding Constitution prohibits
states from barring from sentencing proceedings "any aspect of a defendant's character or
record, or any circumstance surrounding the crime"); Penry, 492 U.S. at 340 (holding that in
order to make individualized assessment of appropriateness of death penalty, evidence of
mental retardation must be given effect in sentencing of the defendant); Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at
398-99 (finding as harmful error jury instruction mandating permissible scope of mitigating
evidence); Eric L. Shwartz, Comment, Penry v. Linaugh: "Idiocy" and the Framers' Intent
Doctrine, 16 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM & CIv. CONFINEMENT 315, 321-24 (1990) (discussing
Texas capital-sentencing statute inclusion of mitigating circumstances). See generally
Jonathan R. Sorensen & James W. Marquart, Prosecutorialand Jury Decision-Makingin PostFurman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 743, 748-50 (1991) (discussing role and use of mitigating factors in Texas sentencing scheme).
203. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (stating executing incompetent
defendant who does not comprehend circumstances of fate is cruel and unusual). In Ford, the
Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a convicted capital offender
who becomes insane while awaiting execution. See id. at 417-18 (holding defendant entitled to
separate evidentiary hearing on competency issue to permit execution). The Court reasoned
that executing individuals who are unaware of their impending execution was incompatible
with the evolving standards of decency and "simply offends humanity." Id. at 409; see also
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989) (finding constitutional sentence of death on mildly
retarded defendant who was competent to stand trial); CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS 290 (ABA Criminal Justice Standards Committee Project ed., 1989) (asserting
that mentally retarded defendant is incompetent to be executed when he or she cannot understand reason for death sentence or nature of punishment); V. Stephen Cohen, Comment, Exempting the Mentally Retardedfrom the Death Penalty: A Comment on Florida's Proposed
Legislation, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 457, 466 (1991) (describing Penry's observation that incompetent defendant must not be executed); Leading Cases - ConstitutionalLaw, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 100, 100 (1986) (discussing Court's adoption of common-law prohibition of executing
incompetent defendants).
204. See State v. Pinski, 163 S.W.2d 785, 787-88 (Mo. 1942) (recognizing mental capacity
includes not only insanity but also any mental incapacity that makes defendant unable to distinguish wrong from right); State v. Johnson, 290 N.W. 159, 162 (Wis. 1940) (finding both
insane and feeble-minded persons can be exonerated from criminal responsibility if unable to
distinguish difference from right and wrong). See generally James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 432-42 (1985)
(discussing criminal responsibility of mentally retarded defendants); Joshua N. Sondheimer,
Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper Considerationof MitigatingFactors
in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409, 417-19 (1990) (acknowledging long-standing debate over what level of mental capacity vitiates criminal responsibility).
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then even when a mentally retarded capital murderer knows the crime is
wrong, understands the judicial proceedings, has the necessary mens rea, has
aggravating factors that far outweigh the mitigating factors, and understands
why the punishment is being imposed, the capital murderer will always escape the death penalty. Rather, state legislators and courts should rely on
the guidelines suggested above in order to provide the individualized consideration demanded by the Constitution.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Capital murder is a uniquely heinous and atrocious crime because of its
final and irreparable nature. The murderer consciously inflicts cruel, inhumane, and degrading pain on the victim, often in a torturous and barbarous
manner. For this reason, the crime of capital murder deserves the death
penalty.
Legislatures and courts throughout the United States should adhere to the
common-law understanding of mental deficiency when considering capital
punishment. Courts should not determine the "evolving standards of decency" by using unreliable I.Q. tests of the mental-health profession as a
unitary measure of mental retardation. Instead, the courts should look to
the mores, concepts, and common law applied throughout the centuries. Because the common law prohibited the punishment of those who were totally
lacking in reason or the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, it
may, indeed, be cruel and unusual punishment to execute persons who are
profoundly retarded and wholly lacking in the capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their actions. However, a finding that the mentally retarded
are categorically exempted from the death penalty, regardless of the degree
of retardation, would in essence mean that no matter how heinous the crime,
and no matter how cognitively functional the mentally retarded offender, he
or she could never be executed, and would then be licensed to kill.
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